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In 2000, a Florida jury awarded a history-making $145 billion in puni-
tive damages against the tobacco industry in a class action suit brought on
behalf of Florida smokers.' The judgment, however, was reversed in its en-
tirety, including the class certification, three years later by Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV). 2 This
year, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the Third District's reversal of the
$145 billion punitive damages award although it rejected much of the Third
District's decision in that case.3
While Engle IV presented a number of intriguing issues, one is espe-
cially noteworthy because of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell (State Farm I)' that was
made the month before the Third District rendered its decision. In State
Farm I, which ironically involved a $145 million punitive award, the Court
reiterated its previous position that excessive punitive damage awards can
run afoul of the United States Constitution and provided further guidance for
courts to determine when this occurs.5 In State Farm I, the Court did the
latter by elaborating more on the appropriate ratio between any award of
punitive damages and that of the compensatory damages.6
After the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in State
Farm I, it was unclear how that case would affect Engle IV since there had
been no total award of compensatory damages to the class to which the $145
billion punitive award could be compared. However, for both the Third Dis-
trict and the Supreme Court of Florida, that fact alone rendered the punitive
1. See Marc Kaufman, Tobacco Suit Award: $145 Billion, WASH. POST, July 15, 2000,
at A1; David Noonan, Lighting into Big Tobacco, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 2000, at 30.
2. 853 So. 2d 434, 440 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part,
rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
3. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 2 (Fla. July 6,
2006). Please note that at the time this article was going to print that this opinion by the Su-
preme Court of Florida was not final due to a rehearing motion which had been filed but not
determined.
4. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
5. Id. at 417-19.
6 ld at 424-28.
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award violative of State Farm 1.7 The two courts further held that the puni-
tive award was unconstitutionally excessive as a matter of law.
8
Whether the punitive award in Engle IV was violative of State Farm I
and/or unconstitutionally excessive under either federal or Florida law war-
rants examination.
I. STATE FARM AND ITS AFTERMATH
The State Farm I case arose out of an automobile accident that occurred
in Utah.9 A state jury in Utah found Curtis Campbell liable for causing a
multi-car accident in which one driver died and another was left permanently
disabled, awarding damages against him of more than $185,000.10 Thereaf-
ter, Campbell and his wife sued their insurance company-which allegedly
had refused to settle and insisted on going to trial-for "bad faith, fraud, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress."" Another Utah jury then
"awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145
million in punitive damages." 2
After the verdict against the insurance company, the trial court reduced
the compensatory award to $1 million and the punitive award to $25 mil-
lion.'3 The Supreme Court of Utah, however, reinstated the full $145 million
punitive award after both parties appealed. " The insurance company then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court which reversed the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Utah and remanded the case back to that court "for
further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion."' 5
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in State Farm I would be-
gin by announcing that the issue in that case concerned "the measure[ment]
of punishment, by means of punitive damages [that] a State may impose
upon a defendant in a civil case."' 6  The Court noted that while
7. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 451; Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 3.
8. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 458; Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 3.
9. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 412-13.
10. Id. at413.
11. Id. at414.
12. Id. at 415.
13. Id.
14. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 415.
15. Id. at 429.
16. Id. at 412. Punitive or exemplary damages are damages which may be awarded to the
plaintiff over and above compensatory damages,
where the wrong done to [plaintiff] was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression,
malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant, and are intended to
solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other
3
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"[c]ompensatory damages 'are [only] intended to redress the concrete loss
that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful con-
duct,' . . . punitive damages serve a broader function [than compensatory
damages as] they are aimed at deterrence and retribution."' 17  Further,
"[w]hile States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages,"
the Court acknowledged, "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary pun-
ishments on a tortfeasor."' 8 The Court explained that "[t]o the extent [a pu-
nitive] award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and con-
stitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property." 9
In evaluating whether a punitive award was excessive, the Court in
State Farm I noted that it had previously
instructed courts reviewing punitive damages to consider three
guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3)
the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases.
20
The Court stated that the first guide post was "[t]he most important in-
dicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award."'2' According to
the Court:
[Courts should] determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by
considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to
economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the
conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated
aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant for his evil behavior or to
make an example of him.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979). In this article, "punitives" and "compensato-
ries" are used interchangeably with "punitive damages" and "compensatory damages."
17. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 416 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)).
18. Id. (citing Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 433).
19. Id. at 417 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting)).
20. Id. at 418 (citing BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
21. Id. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
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actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
22
With respect to the second guide post, the Court noted that it had "been
reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm,
or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award. ' 23 While
the Court would "decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive
damages award [could not] exceed," 24 the Court would make the following
observations:
[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,25 in up-
holding a punitive damages award, we concluded that an award of
more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might
be close to the line of constitutional impropriety. We cited that 4
to 1 ratio again in BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore.26 The
Court further referenced a long legislative history, dating back
over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for sanctions
of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.
While these ratios are not binding, they are instructive. They
demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are
more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the
State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios
in range of 500 to 1, or, in this case, of 145 to 1.27
The Court stated that "ratios greater than those [it had] previously upheld
may comport with due process where 'a particularly egregious act has re-
sulted in only a small amount of economic damages."' 28 The Court, how-
ever, stated that "[t]he converse [was] also true ... [meaning that] [w]hen
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal
to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
22. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77). The Court further
stated that "[t]he existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not
be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them renders any
award suspect." Id.
23. Id. at 424 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
24. Id. at 425.
25. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
26. 517 U.S. at 559.
27. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 425 (citations omitted).
28. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
5
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guarantee."29 The Court further emphasized that "[t]he wealth of a defendant
cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award. 31
In reference to the third guide post, "the disparity between the punitive
damages award and the 'civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases,"' 31 the Court noted that it had "also looked to criminal penalties that
[might] be imposed [on the defendant]. 32 The Court interjected, however,
that "the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically
sustain a punitive damages award.
33
Applying the State Farm I guide posts, the Court found that the case
was "neither close nor difficult,, 34 and that "[i]t was error [for the Supreme
Court of Utah] to reinstate the jury's $145 million punitive damages
award. ' 35 While the Court did not disagree that the insurance company had
engaged in reprehensible conduct-and that an award of punitive damages
was proper-the Court clearly disagreed with the degree of reprehensibility
and declared that "a more modest punishment" was warranted. 36 The prob-
lem as described by the Court was that the case "was used as a platform to
expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of [the insurance company's]
operations throughout the country,"37 and this resulted in punitive damages
being awarded "to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the
Campbells' harm., 3' The Court also stated that there was "no doubt that
there is a presumption [of unconstitutionality] against an award that has a
145 to 1 ratio."39 The Court noted that the $1 million compensatory award in
the case "for a year and a half of emotional distress" was "substantial," and
appeared to "already contain [a] punitive element [in it]."40 The Court fur-
ther noted that "[t]he most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law for the
wrong done to the Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine for an act of fraud,
29. Id.
30. Id. at 427 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 585).
31. Id. at 428 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
32. State Farm , 538 U.S. at 428 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 583; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)). The Court explained that "[t]he existence of a criminal pen-
alty [has a] bearing on the seriousness with which a State views the wrongful action." Id.
33. Id. The Court emphasized that "[p]unitive damages are not a substitute for the crimi-
nal process," and "[g]reat care must be taken to avoid the use of the civil process to assess
criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal trial
have been observed." Id.
34. Id. at 418.
35. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 418.
36. Id. at 419.
37. Id. at 420.
38. Id. at 422.
39. Id. at 426.
40. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 426.
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... an amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award.",4, The
Court termed the Supreme Court of Utah's discussion "about the loss of [the
insurance company's] business license, the disgorgement of profits, and pos-
sible imprisonment" as "speculat[ion]," and stated that this was an "insuffi-
cient [basis] to justify the award., 42
After the Court struck down the $145 million punitive damages award,
the Supreme Court of Utah-in a second review-lowered the punitive dam-
ages to $9 million.4 3 The Court then declined the opportunity to further re-
view the case despite the defendant's claim that the 9 to 1 ratio was still too
high. 44
Immediately after State Farm I was rendered, there was some doubt as
to its applicability since it was a case involving economic injury, and not
personal injury or products liability. 45 That doubt would not last long; within
a month of the decision, the Court vacated a number of other punitive dam-
age awards in state cases and remanded the cases back to the state courts for
reconsideration in light of the principles set forth in State Farm.4
6
One such case involved a plaintiff in an Oregon state court, who was se-
riously injured by a drug and sued the drug manufacturer as well as the doc-
tor who prescribed it.47  The doctor made a cross-claim against the drug
manufacturer for negligence and fraud, alleging that the manufacturer "failed
to provide adequate information concerning [the drug]., 48 The jury returned
verdicts in favor of both the plaintiff and the doctor against the drug manu-
facturer, awarding the plaintiff more than $5 million in compensatory dam-
ages plus $35 million in punitive damages and the doctor $500,000 in com-
41. Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
42. Id. The Court again reiterated that the Supreme Court of Utah's "references were to
the broad fraudulent scheme drawn from evidence of out-of-state and dissimilar conduct." Id.
43. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (State Farm I), 98 P.3d 409, 410 (Utah
2004).
44. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm III), 543 U.S. 874
(2004); State Farm I, 98 P.3d at 418; Robert S. Greenberger, High Court Won't Revisit Dam-
ages: In a Letdown for Business, Justices Pass on Clarifying Punitive-Award Guidelines,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2004, at A6.
45. See Paul J. Martinek, $145 Million Punitive Award Unconstitutional, LAW. WKLY.
U.S.A., Apr. 14, 2003, at 1. "Because State Farm [I] did not involve a personal injury, [one
defense lawyer] suspect[ed] that some courts might argue that the rationale doesn't apply to
product liability cases and other suits involving physical harm." Id. at 27 (quoting Andrew
Frey).
46. See Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc. (Bocci IV), 76 P.3d 669, 672 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); see
generally Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (Romo 1), 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Ct. App. 2002); Sand
Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (Sand Hill 1), 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002).
47. See Bocci IV, 76 P.3d at 671.
48. Id.
7
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pensatory damages plus $22.5 million in punitive damages.49 After the drug
manufacturer appealed, the company settled with the plaintiff, but continued
to challenge the punitive damages awarded to the doctor.5" On appeal, the
manufacturer claimed that "an award of $22.5 million in punitive damages
[was] excessive in relation to the $500,000 that the jury awarded [the doctor]
for compensatory damages."'', After two reviews by an Oregon intermediate
appellate court, the $22.5 million punitive damages award was upheld in its
entirety. 52 The United States Supreme Court, however, vacated and re-
manded the case based on State Farm and the state appellate court was re-
quired to review the issue for a third time.53 On the third review, the state
appellate court required the doctor to accept a punitive damages award of
$3.5 million, a 7 to 1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, or face a
new trial.54
Two other state cases where the United States Supreme Court vacated
the punitive damages award and ordered that they be reconsidered in light of
State Farm involved the automaker Ford Motor Company.55 In one case, a
California jury awarded $290 million in punitive damages against the auto-
maker in a sport-utility vehicle rollover accident that killed three individu-
49. Id.
50. Id. at 672.
51. Id.
52. See Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc. (Bocci I1), 22 P.3d 758 (Or. 2001); Bocci v. Key
Pharms., Inc. (Bocci 1), 974 P.2d 758 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). In the first appeal, an equally di-
vided appeals court affirmed the judgment in favor of the doctor. See Bocci I, 974 P.2d at 774
(en banc). The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, vacated the decision and remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of its findings in Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473,
483-84 (Or. 2001), where it had stated that a punitive award is "grossly excessive" in viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion where it is not within the range that a rational juror could award. Bocci II, 22 P.3d at 759.
After remand, the appeals court considered Parrott as well as BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), in its second review and again affirmed the punitive award. See
Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc. (Bocci II1), 35 P.3d 1106, 1108, 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). Ac-
cording to the appellate court, the drug manufacturer had only "argued that the total punitive
damage award of $57 million in favor of [the plaintiff] and [the doctor] was excessive .... "
Id. at 1108. While the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages would be 45 to 1 if the
damages were viewed separately and apart from the damages to the plaintiff, when they are
considered collectively, the ratio of the punitive damages award to the compensatory damages
award would only be approximately 10 to 1. See id. at 1111 n.3; Bocci IV, 76 P.3d at 675.
The appellate court "concluded that, evaluated in their entirety, the punitive damages were not
excessive" and the Supreme Court of Oregon would later decline further review. See Bocci
IV, 76 P.3d at 672 (citing Bocci Ii, 35 P.3d at 1111).
53. See Key Pharms., Inc. v. Edwards, 538 U.S. 974 (2003).
54. Bocci IV, 76 P.3d at 676.
55. Ford Motor Co. v. Romo (Romo 11), 538 U.S. 1028 (2003) (mem.); Ford Motor Co. v.
Estate of Smith (Sand Hill I1), 538 U.S. 1028 (2003) (mem.).
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als.16 In the other, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found that the automaker
should pay $15 million in punitive damages to the family of a miner killed
when a Ford pickup truck slipped into reverse and crushed him, although the
jury had actually awarded $20 million in such damages. 7 While the punitive
damages award in the California case exceeded the single-digit ratio of puni-
tive to compensatory damages,5 8 the United States Supreme Court discarded
the already reduced punitive award in the Kentucky case 59 even though there
was only a 5 to 1 ratio in that case. 60  After the California case was re-
manded, the state appellate court "conditionally affirm[ed] the punitive dam-
ages portion of the judgment ... conditioned upon plaintiffs' acceptance of
reduction of the punitive damages portion of the judgment [from $290 mil-
lion] to $23,723,287,' ' 6' resulting in a reduction of almost 92%. After its
case was returned, the Supreme Court of Kentucky vacated the punitive
damages award and remanded the case back to the trial court "for a new de-
termination of the amount of punitive damages. 62
The United States Supreme Court's actions shortly after State Farm
quickly made clear that its guidelines on punitive damages were applicable to
both personal injury and product liability cases.63 They also demonstrated
that the Supreme Court had placed itself in a position to monitor punitive
56. Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (Romo 1), 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2002).
57. Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (Sand Hill 1), 83 S.W.3d 483, 496 (Ky.
2002).
58. Romo 1, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. While the jury in the California case found that the
plaintiffs' total compensatory damages were $6,226,793.00, it also found that one of the plain-
tiffs had been 10% at fault. Id. Consequently, the trial court reduced the compensatory award
to $4,935,709.10. Id. Depending upon which of these figures ($6,226,793.00 or
$4,935,709.10) is used to calculate the ratio, it is either 47 to 1 or 59 to 1. Id.
59. SandHill 11, 538 U.S. at 1028.
60. Sand Hill I, 83 S.W.3d at 497. There was a $3 million compensatory award in that
case. Id.
61. Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (Romo II1), 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 797 (Ct. App. 2003). If the
plaintiffs declined such acceptance, the punitive damages judgment would be reversed and a
new trial would be had on the issue. Id. at 813.
62. Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Smith (Sand Hill I11), 142 S.W.3d 153, 168 (Ky. 2004).
Although the Supreme Court of Kentucky had rejected the automaker's challenge to the jury
instructions as they related to punitive damages in its earlier opinion, it now found that those
instructions had been insufficient "in light of State Farm." Id. at 155-56 (quoting Ford Motor
Co. v. Estate of Smith (Sand Hill I1), 538 U.S. at 1028). According to the court, State Farm
necessitated instructions that "set[] forth the purpose of punitive damages and provide[d] a
safeguard from extraterritorial punishment" and that the trial court's jury instructions had
failed to do the latter. Id. at 166.
63. See Sand Hill II, 538 U.S. at 1028; Key Pharms., Inc. v. Edwards, 538 U.S. 974, 974
(2003); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Romo (Romo I), 538 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2003).
9
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damages whether they are awarded in federal or state court. 64 Further, as the
Kentucky case demonstrates, the Court appears willing to exercise this juris-
diction even where the punitive award does not exceed a single-digit ratio of
65punitives to compensatories.
Shortly after State Farm, some predicted that the tobacco industry
would become a big beneficiary of the Court's punitive damages ruling.66
Engle is not the only example in which this is true.67
In Henley v. Philip Morris Inc (Henley ), 68 a California jury awarded
"$1.5 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive dam-
ages" to a smoker who developed lung cancer. 69 The trial judge, however,
ordered a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, unless the smoker con-
sented to a reduction of such damages to $25 million.7 ° The "[smoker] con-
sented to the reduction.' The cigarette manufacturer, against whom the
award had been rendered, appealed claiming that the $25 million punitive
award was still unconstitutionally excessive.72 Initially, the California Court
of Appeals for the First District upheld the damage award7 3 but the Supreme
Court of California ordered its reconsideration in light of State Farm.74 On
remand, the court of appeals found that while the cigarette manufacturer's
conduct in that case "supports a substantial award ... and warrants some-
64. See Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (Romo 1), 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2002);
see also Sand Hill 1, 83 S.W.3d at 496.
65. See Sand Hill I, 83 S.W.3d at 483; see also Sand Hill 111, 142 S.W.3dat 153.
66. See, e.g., Lorraine Woellert & Mike France, Tort Reform Has Friends in High
Places, Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 2003, at 78 ("The [tobacco] industry gets hit with the most puni-
tive damages awards, so it could be a big winner.").
67. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams 111), 92 P.3d 126, 146 (Or. Ct. App. 2004);
see Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I/), 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 75 (Ct. App. 2004).
68. 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Ct. App. 2001).
69. Id. at 496.
70. Id.
71. Id. This made the total award to plaintiff $26.5 million. See id.
.72. See Henley II, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38.
73. See Henley I, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 509.
74. See Henley 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38. This actually was the second time that the Su-
preme Court of California remanded the case back to the intermediate appellate court. See id.
The first remand occurred when the California appeals court was ordered to reconsider the
case in light of two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of California: Myers v. Philip
Morris Inc., 50 P.3d 751 (Cal. 2002), and Naegele v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 50 P.3d 769
(Cal. 2002). See Henley II, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38. The issue in Myers and Naegele concerned
state "immunity." See Myers, 50 P.3d at 753; see also Naegele, 50 P.3d at 771. Apparently,
this California statute granted tobacco manufacturers "immunity" from most claims for per-
sonal injury but was repealed. See Henley II, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 41. These two cases dealt
with the effect of the repeal (to what extent it continues to shield tobacco companies) and the
scope of the protection it afforded. See id.
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thing approaching the maximum punishment consistent with constitutional
principles, ' , 71 the $25 million in punitives could not be sustained in light of
the relatively small $1.5 million compensatory.76 Consequently, the court of
appeals reduced the punitive award to $9 million, a sum it found "permissi-
ble and appropriate on [the] record ' 77 explaining as follows:
In light of [State Farm] we do not believe the 17 to 1 ratio re-
flected in the present judgment can withstand scrutiny. As we read
that case, a double-digit ratio will be justified rarely, and perhaps
never in a case where the plaintiff has recovered an ample award
of compensatory damages. Indeed, where a plaintiff has been fully
compensated with a substantial compensatory award, any ratio
over 4 to I is "close to the line." Nonetheless we believe a higher
ratio (6 to 1) is justified here by the extraordinarily reprehensible
conduct of which plaintiff was a direct victim .... [This smoker's]
injuries were not merely economic, but physical, and nothing done
by [the cigarette manufacturer] mitigated or ameliorated them in
any respect. 78
Despite the fact that the jury's original $50 million punitive award had
been reduced by more than four-fifths to $9 million, the cigarette manufac-
turer later sought further review from the Supreme Court of California, as
well as the United States Supreme Court; both declined to disturb the
award. 
In another tobacco case, Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams III), 8°
an Oregon state court jury awarded the family of a smoker, who died of lung
cancer, $821,485.80 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive
damages. 8' The trial judge thereafter reduced the compensatory damages to
75. Id. at 70. The California Court of Appeals explained its rationale as follows:
The record reflects that defendant touted to children what it knew to be a cumulatively toxic
substance, while doing everything it could to prevent them and other addicts and prospective
addicts from appreciating the true nature and effects of that product. The result of this conduct
was that millions of youngsters, including [this smoker], were persuaded to participate in a
habit that was likely to, and did, bring many of them to early illness and death.
Id.
76. See id. at 72.
77. See Henley I1, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 69.
78. Id. at 73 (citation omitted).
79. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Henley (Henley IV), 544 U.S. 920 (2005); Henley v. Philip
Morris USA (Henley I11), 97 P.3d 814 (Cal. 2004); Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I1), 9
Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 38 (Ct. App. 2004).
80. 92 P.3d 126 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
81. Id. at 130.
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$521,485.80 and the punitive damages award to $32 million.82 The state
appeals court, however, reinstated the full $79.5 punitive damages award.83
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the state appellate
court and returned the case back to the appeals court to reconsider in light of
the State Farm ruling.8 4 Despite the United States Supreme Court's admoni-
tion and its subsequent consideration of State Farm,85 the appeals court rein-
stated the total $79.5 million punitive award, specifically finding that the
second guide post was met despite an acknowledgement that the punitive
award amounted to "a 96 to 1 ratio between the compensatory and punitive
damages."86  In making this determination, the court relied on two United
States Supreme Court decisions decided prior to State Farm, which had indi-
cated that it is appropriate to consider the potential harm, as well as the ac-
tual harm caused by the defendant's conduct. 87 The appeals court concluded
that while the jury found actual harm to the smoker of $821,485.80 in dam-
ages, "[the cigarette manufacturer] inflicted potential harm on the members
of the public in Oregon."8 8 The Supreme Court of Oregon, which had earlier
declined to accept jurisdiction in this case, allowed review this time.89 While
it disagreed with the intermediate appellate court regarding the second guide
post and specifically stated that it was not met, Oregon's highest court, nev-
ertheless, affirmed the appellate court's decision upholding the award in its
entirety because it was supported by the other two guide posts.9° The United
States Supreme Court granted the Williams cigarette manufacturer's petition
for certiorari, and whether that punitive award will survive the nation's high
court's third intervention remains to be seen.9'
82. Id.
83. Id. The family of the smoker apparently only appealed the reduction of the punitive
damage award. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams 1), 48 P.3d 824, 829 (Or. Ct. App.
2002). The decision by the Oregon appeals court was said to "mark[] the first time a jury's
award of punitive damages against a tobacco company [had] been upheld in its entirety."
Milo Geyelin, Court Reinstates Tobacco Ruling, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at A3.
84. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (Williams 11), 540 U.S. 801, 801 (2003).
85. Id. The Oregon appellate court would perform a complete analysis based on the Gore
guide posts as refined by State Farm. See Williams 111, 92 P.3d at 142-46.
86. Williams 111, 92 P.3d at 144.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); see also TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993). The court further stated that even if
the punitive award was deemed to exceed a single digit ratio, the "unique facts in [that] case"
would justify it. Williams I1, 92 P.3d at 145.
89. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams IV), 104 P.3d 601, 601 (Or. 2004).
90. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams V), 127 P.3d 1165, 1181-82 (Or. 2006).
91. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, No. 05-1256
(Or. Mar. 30, 2006).
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II. ENGLE IV AND THE THIRD DISTRICT
Engle was a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of a "class of smok-
ers and their survivors" seeking damages for alleged smoking related inju-
ries. 9' The defendants included the "major domestic cigarette companies and
two industry organizations" (hereinafter "tobacco defendants").9 3 The six
named plaintiffs were individuals who were smokers. 94  "All six [named
plaintiffs] alleged [that] they were unable to stop smoking because they were
addicted to nicotine and, as a result, developed medical problems ranging
from cancer and heart disease to colds and sore throats. 95
The six named plaintiffs brought the class action for personal injuries
against the tobacco defendants seeking damages for injuries caused by smok-
ing.96 In their complaint, they asserted claims of "strict liability, negligence,
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, fraud, conspiracy to
commit fraud, and intentional infliction of emotion distress."9' "They sought
over $100 billion in compensatory damages" as well as over "$100 billion in
punitive damages" on behalf of themselves and their class. 98 The trial court
initially certified a class of smokers and their survivors "as a nationwide
class action." 99 On appeal, however, the Third District Court of Appeal "re-
duced the class to include Florida smokers only."' 00 After the case was re-
manded, the trial court issued its trial plan with respect to the case. ' 01
92. Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 441 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
93. Id. The companies were: Philip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., Lorillard Tobacco Co. and Lorillard Inc. (collectively, "Loril-
lard"), and Liggett Group Inc. and Brooke Group Holding Inc. (collectively, "Liggett"). Id. at
441 n.l. The two industry organizations were the Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A., Inc.
and the Tobacco Institute, Inc. Id.
94. Id. at 440.
95. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 440.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 441.
98. Id.
99. Id. The class was defined by the trial court as follows: "All United States citizens
and residents, and their survivors, who have suffered, presently suffer or have died from dis-
eases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine."
Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441.
100. Id. (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle (Engle 1), 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
101. Id. The trial court issued the trial plan and "refused the [tobacco] defendants' request
to decertify the class," after which the tobacco "defendants sought review of both orders be-
fore the Third District," but their appeal was dismissed. Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of
Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871, 873 (2001) (discussing R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle (Engle 11), 711 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
13
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The trial plan provided for the trial proceedings to be divided into
three phases: o
Phase 1 consisted of a year-long trial on liability and entitlement to
punitive damages [with] [t]he jury consider[ing] common issues
relating exclusively to defendants' conduct and the general health
effects of smoking. At the conclusion of Phase 1, the jury ren-
dered a verdict for the class on all counts. In Phase 2, the jury de-
termined that the three [named plaintiffs] were entitled to compen-
satory damages ... total[ing]... $12.7 million.' 03
The jury also determined in Phase 2 that the entire class was entitled to puni-
tive damages totaling $145 billion.' °4 In Phase 3, a new jury was supposed
to decide the "individual liability and compensatory damages claims for each
class member" after which, "[t]he trial court [was to] then divide the $145
billion punitive award equally among the successful class members."' 5
However, Phase 3 was interrupted because the tobacco defendants appealed
after the verdicts in Phase 2.106
In the appeal after the Phase 2 verdicts, the Third District reversed the
entire judgment as well as the trial court order certifying the class.'0 7 Al-
though the appellate court had previously approved the class certification, 0 8
102. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441-42.
103. Id. at 441.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 442. After the punitive damages verdict was rendered, but before entry of
judgment, the tobacco defendants temporarily removed the case to federal court. Engle v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Engle III), 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000). The removal
occurred after a health care plan-Southeastern Iron Workers Health Care Plan-filed a "Mo-
tion to Intervene seeking permission to assert subrogation claims under Florida law on behalf
of itself and similarly situated funds and insurers for reimbursement from damages recovered
by any beneficiary or insured who is a member of the Engle class." Id. The tobacco defen-
dants thereafter removed the case on the basis that these subrogation claims implicated the
Federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act, otherwise known as ERISA. Id. The
district court would remand the case finding "that a nonparty's mere motion to intervene can-
not furmish a basis for removal." Id. at 1363.
106. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d. at 442. After the verdicts in Phase 2, the tobacco defendants
filed several post-verdict motions; however, the trial court, in an Omnibus Order, denied the
motions, except in minor respects, and upheld the verdicts. Id. at 441-42. Further, in the
Omnibus Order the trial court would order "immediate payment to the individual plaintiffs,"
as well as direct the tobacco "defendants to immediately pay the $145 billion in punitive dam-
ages into the court registry for the benefit of the entire class." Id. at 442. The defendants then
appealed the Omnibus Order. Id.
107. Id. at 470.
108. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441. As noted, the Third District had modified the class from
a nationwide class to include Florida smokers only. Id.
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the court found that the class was improperly certified stating "that the plain-
tiff's smokers' claims are uniquely individualized and cannot satisfy the
'predominance' and 'superiority' requirements imposed by Florida's class
action rules."' 9 The Third District made a number of other rulings against
the plaintiffs in reference to the damage award, as well as with respect to
other aspects of the case:
e The court held that the punitive damage award was barred by the to-
bacco settlement between the cigarette makers and the states under the doc-
trine of res judicata. " 0
* Additionally, the court held that the trial court erred "by instructing
the jury not to consider the "tobacco settlement between the cigarette manu-
facturers and the states, as well as the specific agreement between the State
of Florida and the cigarette makers "with regard to the issue of punishment
and deterrence."'
109. Id. at 444 (citing Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 149 (3d Cir. 1998)).
The court emphasized that Rule 1.220(d)(1) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure permits
class certification orders to be "altered or amended at any time before entry of a judgment."
Id. at 442. The court noted that since "[c]lass-certification orders necessarily precede substan-
tial development of the issues and facts ... a court is required to reassess its class rulings as
the case develops." Id. Additionally, the Third District would note that "since [its] affir-
mance of certification in 1996, virtually all courts that have addressed the issue have con-
cluded that certification of smokers' cases is unworkable and improper." Engle IV, 853 So. 2d
at 443-44 (citations omitted). According to the court, "Phase 2 of the trial conclusively estab-
lished that individualized issues of liability, affirmative defenses, and damages, outweighed
any 'common issues' in this case, and that class representation [was] not superior." Id. at 445.
Specifically, the court stated that Phase 2 showed that "each claimant will have to prove that
his or her illness not only was caused by smoking, but was also proximately caused by defen-
dants' alleged misconduct." Id. at 446. The court also stated that this is "evidenced by the
fact that affirmative defenses and damages must be litigated individually." Id. at 447. The
court further pointed to individualized choice-of-law problems. Id. at 447-49.
110. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 467-68. The court would explain its rationale as follows:
The claims for punitive damages in the Florida v. American Tobacco Co. case and
in this action are based on the same ... alleged misconduct and the same public in-
terest. The plaintiffs, as private parties, do not have a "right" to punitive damages;
punitive damages are awarded solely as a matter of public rights or interests, in or-
der to serve the public policy of punishment and deterrence. Accordingly, as a mat-
ter of law, Florida's settlement and release, and the resjudicata effect of the result-
ing final judgment, preclude the plaintiffs' punitive damage claims here.
Id. at 468 (citations omitted).
111. Id. The Third District stated that the tobacco settlement "clearly qualiftied] as evi-
dence relevant to punishment and deterrence" and that "[tihe defendants were entitled to have
the jury consider the [tobacco settlements] as potential mitigating factors in determining the
need for further punishment and deterrence, especially with regard to claims for the same
alleged misconduct." Id. at 469. The court found that "[tihe trial court erred in providing the
jury with an instruction that removed a disputed issue from the jury's consideration." Id. at
470. According to the court, "[tihis error effectively precluded the defendants from presenting
15
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* Also, the court found that neither the punitive award nor the com-
pensatory damage award, as it related to one of the tobacco defendants, was
supported by the evidence and, according to the court, was "[p]roof of a 'run-
away jury.'"l11
e The court found that "[p]laintiffs' counsel [made] improper race-
based appeals [to the jury] for nullification [that] caused irreparable preju-
dice and require[d] reversal" because such conduct "incited" the "predomi-
nantly African-American jury" "to disregard the law because the defendants
[were] tobacco companies.""l 3
* Moreover, the court referenced other purported misconduct by plain-
tiffs' counsel, saying that "plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly made legally im-
proper arguments to the jury regarding the payment of any [punitive]
award,""' 4 "referred to matters outside the evidence," 5 made derogatory per-
sonal remarks about opposing counsel," 6 and expressed his personal opinion
to the jury" about the case, 117 as well as to some of the defense witnesses. "8
crucial mitigation evidence in the form of the [tobacco settlements] to support the argument
that they had already received heavy financial obligations and binding deterrent measures for
precisely the same conduct." Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 470. For the court, "[t]he resulting
prejudice [was] clearly evidenced by the astronomically excessive punitive damages award."
Id.
112. Id. at 466. The court would explain that while "[t]he Phase 1 verdict found all defen-
dants liable . . . in the first part of Phase 2, the jury allocated zero fault to [this one tobacco
defendant] with respect to the non-punitive counts." Id. The tobacco defendant, however,
would be "held jointly and severally liable for 100% of the compensatory damages award to
each of the three named plaintiffs." Id. Additionally, the tobacco defendant had to pay $790
million dollars in punitive damages. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 467 n.47. Apparently, none of
the three named plaintiffs in Phase 2 had ever used this tobacco defendant's cigarettes, which
explains the allocation of zero fault to it in Phase 2. Id. at 467. For the appellate court, this
meant that the jury found the tobacco defendant liable because of "[miere participation in the
tobacco industry." Id.
113. Id. at458-59,461.
114. Id. at 463. The court indicated that "plaintiffs [sic] counsel repeatedly... urg[ed] the
jury to assume [that] any award would be payable in installments over decades into the fu-
ture," thereby, "ensur[ing] there would be no realistic check on the jury entering a bankrupting
award." Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 463-64.
115. Id. at 464. Apparently, one example is plaintiffs' counsel telling "the jury the defen-
dants' CEO witnesses lied to him under oath during their depositions." Id. at 465.
116. Id. at 464. The court claimed that "[p]laintiffs' counsel maligned a defense attorney
by name, calling the attorney's argument to the jury 'a fraud."' Id.
117. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 464. The court complained that plaintiffs' counsel "ex-
pressed his personal opinions about the merits of the case stating the defendants' position
made him grit his teeth and say to himself: 'Can anyone buy this?"' Id. Plaintiffs' counsel
also purportedly stated that the "defendants had engaged in the 'longest running con in the
history of the world,' and [that] 'our kids and grandchildren' will ask 'how did you let them
get away with it?' Id. at 465.
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* The court would indicate, in a footnote, that "none of the three plain-
tiffs presented a proper claim within the class action [during Phase 2].""9
In addition to the above, the Third District would further hold that the
$145 billion punitive damage award was unconstitutionally "excessive as a
matter of law"'2 and that, in fact, the award had been improper because it
"preclud[ed] the constitutionally required comparison of punitive damages
and compensatory damages." '21
The Third District would specifically state that the $145 billion punitive
award was excessive under both Florida and federal law. 2 2 The court would
cite to Florida law for the proposition "that punitive damages may not be
assessed in an amount which will financially destroy or bankrupt a defen-
dant."' 123 The court emphasized that "[t]he [cigarette makers] established that
their combined net worth was no more than $8.3 billion" and that "[t]he $145
billion verdict [was] roughly 18 times ... [that] net worth."' 1 4 The court also
118. Id. at 464-65. According to the court:
Plaintiffs' counsel ... repeatedly expressed his personal opinions about the defen-
dants' witnesses, making such comments as: "I wanted to punch" one witness; that
another witness "wouldn't know science if he fell on science;" that he was sure an-
other witness "was ashamed to give this answer, but he gave it... under oath;" and
that as to another witness, "I figured, well, this guy hasn't been prepped on the sub-
ject [by counsel], so maybe I'll get an honest answer."
Id.
119. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 453-54 n.23. The appellate court would state that all of the
claims of one of the plaintiffs were barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at 454 n.23.
The trial court had found that while the statute barred most of this plaintiff's claims, his fraud
claim and its derivative conspiracy claim were not so barred as there was "an exception to the
statute of limitations bar in the case of continuing fraud." Id. The Third District rejected the
trial court's position finding that the case relied on by it did not support such an outcome. Id.
With respect to the other two plaintiffs in Phase 2, the appellate court would state that "judg-
ment should have been entered in favor of the defendants as to [them] ... because their claims
did not accrue until years after the cut-off date for class membership." Id. The appellate court
would explain as follows: "By its terms, the class definition includes only those smokers who
developed a disease by October 31, 1994. Since [one] was diagnosed in April 1996, and [the
other] was diagnosed in February 1997, they [were] clearly excluded from the class ......
Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 454 n.23.
120. Id. at458.
121. Id.at450.
122. Id. at 456.
123. Id. (citing Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039,
1043 (Fla. 1982); Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 188 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Brooks v. Rios, 707 So. 2d 374, 375 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Hockensmith v. Waxler,
524 So. 2d 714, 715 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)). According to the court, it was "acknowl-
edged by even the plaintiffs' purported experts [in Engle] [that] the $145 billion punitive
award will extract all value from the defendants and put them out of business." Engle IV, 853
So. 2d at 456.
124. Id. at 456-57.
17
Reeder: Engle, State Farm, Florida Law, and Punitive Damages: Was the $14
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LA WREVIEW
emphasized that "[t]here [was] no precedential authority for such an award"
and that "[n]o Florida decision endorses even a remotely comparable award,"
as "[t]he largest reported [Florida] awards involved only a fraction of a de-
fendant's net worth."' 25 The court would cite to federal law for the proposi-
tion that "[f]ederal due process also prohibits 'excessive' punitive
awards."' 26 Specifically citing State Farm, the Third District would exclaim
that "[t]his unprecedented punitive damages award is excessive as a matter of
law and, thus, does not promote a valid societal interest."' 27 The court would
even suggest that since "[p]unitive damages are imposed to benefit society's
interests," the $145 billion award would "frustrate the societal interest in
protecting all injured claimants' rights to at least recover compensatory dam-
ages for their smoking related injuries" since "[s]mokers with viable com-
pensable claims will have no remedy if the bankrupting punitive award...
[were] upheld."2 8
The Third District would also state that the punitive damages award in
Engle IV put the '"[c]art [b]efore [the] [h]orse"' where it was made "without
the necessary [prerequisite] finding[] of liability and compensatory dam-
ages."' 2 9 While the appellate court would acknowledge that determinations
of liability were made in Phase 2, it would apparently find them insufficient
to justify the class-wide punitive award, since they related to only three indi-
viduals. 130 According to the court, "[t]he defendants [were] entitled to a jury
determination, on an individualized basis, as to whether and to what extent
each particular class member is entitled to receive punitive damages."'
' 3
'
125. Id. at 457.
126. Id. at 456 n.27 (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 434 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993)).
127. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 458 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State
Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2003)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 450. The court found that "compensatory damages must be ... [determined
before] punitive damages." Id. at 451 (citing Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 457 (Fla. 1989)
(Ehrlich, C.J., concurring)). Otherwise, it would be impossible to compare the two to deter-
mine if the "punitive damages bear a 'reasonable' relationship to the actual harm inflicted on
the plaintiff, as required by Florida and federal law." Id.
130. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 450 n.16. The court explained that "[t]he jury did not
determine [that the tobacco] defendants were liable to anyone [in Phase 1]," but only "an-
swered certain general questions about the defendants' products and conduct." Id. at 450.
The court noted that while these questions related to some of the legal elements, of each legal
theory alleged, they did not relate to all of the elements, of each such theory, and that
"[e]ssential elements of liability, such as reliance and proximate cause, were never tried in
Phase 1." Id.
131. Id. at453.
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Evidently, any class-wide punitive award rendered-where there was no
prior determination of liability and compensatory damages, with respect to
the entire class-would be improper for the appeals court. 1
3 2
III. FLORIDA'S HIGHEST COURT IN ENGLE
After the Third District would deny a motion to certify the case to the
Supreme Court of Florida, as an issue of great public interest, an attorney, in
the law firm that had represented the tobacco defendants in the appeal, would
be quoted as saying that "[w]e are confident that there is no basis for a claim
of conflict,"' 33 which reportedly was the only other route for the plaintiffs in
Engle to obtain review by the Supreme Court of Florida.' 34  The Supreme
Court of Florida, however, would grant the plaintiffs' petition for review,'3 5
and two years later issue its opinion. 1
36
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida would indicate
that it granted jurisdiction in Engle VI, because the Third District "misap-
plie[d]" its decision in Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co. "' The
Court would thereafter reject much of the decision by the Third District, but
"approve... [its] reversal of the $145 billion class action punitive damages
award." 1
38
The Supreme Court of Florida held "that the Third District erred in nul-
lifying its previous affirmance of the trial court's certification order,"'3 9 al-
132. See id. at 456 ("The trial plan in the instant case required the defendants to pay puni-
tive damages for supposed injuries to thousands of class members without the necessary pre-
requisite findings of liability and compensatory damages.").
133. Laurie Cunningham, Appeals Court Refuses to Rehear 'Engle' Tobacco Suit, DAILY
Bus. REv., Sept. 24, 2003.
134. For a very comprehensive discussion of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Florida, see generally Harry Lee Anstead, et al., The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court of Florida, 29 NOVA L. Rev. 431 (2005).
135. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle P), 873 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2004).
136. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
137. 46 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1950) (en banc). See Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip. op. at 1 (ref-
erencing Young, 46 So. 2d 26). The Third District had relied on Young for its ruling that the
punitive damages claim was barred by the Florida Tobacco Settlement. See Engle IV, 853 So.
2d at 468. The Third District would explain the holding in Young as follows:
[T]he [Supreme Court of Florida] held that a judgment in a suit involving a municipal corpora-
tion which resolved "a matter of general interest to all its citizens" was binding even though
they were not parties to the suit. The court reasoned that each citizen "is a real, although not a
nominal, party to such judgment, and [could not] relitigate any of the questions which were
litigated in the original action." Thus, once a governmental agency resolves a matter of public
rights or interests, the same matter cannot thereafter be relitigated by private parties.
Id. (citation omitted).
138. See Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 2.
139. Id. at 28.
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though it "agree[d] with the Third District that problems with the three-phase
trial plan negate the continued viability of th[e] class action." 140  The Su-
preme Court of Florida found that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.220(d)(1) did not authorize the Third District to simply change its position
and reverse its previous ruling, which upheld the trial certification order; 4'
and determined that "under the doctrine of law of the case, the Third District
would have been justified in reversing its previous ruling ... only if it con-
cluded that the prior ruling would have resulted in a clear manifest injus-
tice."' 42 For the Supreme Court of Florida, "no circumstances existed that
justified the subsequent ... reconsideration of the prior Third District deci-
sion approving class certification."' 143 The Court, however, found "that con-
tinued class action treatment for Phase III of the trial plan [was] not feasible
because individualized issues such as legal causation, comparative fault, and
damages predominate."' 44  Although the Court noted that there were "no
Florida cases address[ing] whether it [was] appropriate under [Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure] 1.220(d)(4)(A) to certify class treatment for only limited
liability issues,"' 145 it relied on "several decisions by federal appellate courts
applying a similar provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"'146 as
"persuasive authority" for it to do so in Engle V. 147 The end result was that
the Court "decertiffied] the class, [but] retain[ed] the jury's Phase I findings,
other than those on the fraud and intentional infliction of emotion[al] distress
claims, which [it stated] involved highly individualized determinations, and
140. Id. at 32.
141. Id. at 28. According to the Court, the rule only "provide[d] an avenue for reexaming
[sic] certification if subsequent discovery shows that circumstances have changed." Id.
142. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 29 (citing Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Juliano, 801
So. 2d 101, 106 (Fla. 2001)).
143. Id. at 30. In fact, the Court found that the Third District's opinion on this issue "was
flawed" in two respects. Id. One, the Court found that the Third District "ignored the trial
court's pretrial ruling that only Florida law would apply when [the Third District] stated that
the 'choice-of-law analysis in [Engle VI would] require examination of numerous significantly
different state laws governing the different plaintiffs' claims."' Id. (quoting Liggett Group
Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app'd in part,
quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006)). Two, the Supreme Court of
Florida stated that "none of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Third District... to
justify decertification was in the procedural posture of [Engle V]." Id.
144. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 32.
145. Id. at 33. The Court noted this rule provides that "[w]hen appropriate ... a claim or
defense may be brought or maintained on behalf of a class concerning particular issues." Id.
at 32-33 (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(4)(A)).
146. Id. at 33. This was Rule 23(c)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
states "[w]hen appropriate ... an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
147. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 33.
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the finding on entitlement to punitive damages question, which [it found to
have been] premature."' 48
The Supreme Court of Florida also held that "reversal [was] not war-
ranted based on the remarks made by the Engle Class's Counsel," finding
that "under the totality of the circumstances" such comments did not rise to
the level of reversible error. '49 Moreover, the Court found that:
a review of the verdicts reveals that each verdict reflected a careful
and differentiated analysis as to comparative fault and individual
damages and in no way justifie[d] the Third District's overall con-
clusion that this was a runaway jury inflamed by race because of
the arguments directed to the four of the six members of the jury
who were African-American.' 
50
148. Id. at 36. The jury findings were as follows:
(1) that cigarettes cause some of the diseases at issue; (2) that nicotine is addictive; (3) that the
defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous;
(4) that the defendants made a false or misleading statement of material fact with the intention
of misleading smokers; (4)(a) that the defendants concealed or omitted material information
not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to
disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes
or both; (5) that all of the defendants agreed to misrepresent information relating to the health
effects of cigarettes or the addictive nature of cigarettes with the intention that smokers and the
public would rely on this information to their detriment; (5)(a) that the defendants agreed to
conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature
with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detri-
ment; (6) that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective; (7) that all
of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that at the time of the sale or supply did not con-
form to representations of fact made by the defendants; (8) that all of the defendants were neg-
ligent; (9) that all of the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct or with reck-
less disregard relating to cigarettes sold or supplied to Florida smokers with the intent to inflict
severe emotional distress; and (10) that all of the defendants' conduct rose to a level that would
permit an award of punitive damages,
Id. at 8 n.4. The court would specifically state that findings 1, 2, 3, 4a, 5, 5a, 6 and 8 could
stand and that findings 4 and 9 could not. Id. at 4.
149. Id. at 39. The Court noted that Engle's "counsel ventured very close to the line of
reversible error on a number of occasions in his attempt to counteract opposing counsel's
contentions that Tobacco acted lawfully and to communicate his message to the jury that
'legal doesn't make it right."' Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 39. The Court, however,
found that the context in which the statements were made was "crucial" in evaluating them
and emphasized that they had been spread out over a two-year period. Id. at 41. Further, the
Court found that some of the comments that supposedly were improper pleas for jury nullifi-
cation "were not an attempt to tell the jury to ignore the law" but simply "made in response to
Tobacco's preemption defense: that the warnings on the cigarettes were as provided by law"
and Tobacco's position during the trial that cigarettes were a legal product. Id. at 45.
150. Id. at 46. The Court did state that:
[t]here [was] absolutely no justification for [a] series of remarks [by Engle's counsel], which
appear[ed] to compare the tobacco industry with slavery and, [finding that his references to]
21
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Although the Supreme Court of Florida "agree[d] that the [Third Dis-
trict] properly held that all judgments in favor of [one of the three class rep-
resentatives] were barred by the applicable statute of limitations," it dis-
agreed with the Third District on the issue of whether the other two class
representatives were properly included within the class as certified by the
trial court.' 5' Consequently, it "quash[ed] the [Third District's] reversal of
judgment entered in favor of [those two] class representatives . . . [and] or-
der[ed] that the judgments be reinstated."1 52
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the Third District that the
judgments against the one tobacco defendant had to be reversed because this
defendant "'did not manufacture or sell any of the products that allegedly
caused injury to the individual plaintiff representatives."" 53  In contrast to
the Third District, however, the Supreme Court appeared not to view this as
"proof of a 'runaway jury .'.15 but simply an "inconsistency in the ver-
dict." 55
The Supreme Court of Florida held "that the Third District erred in ap-
plying the doctrine of res judicata to bar the Engle Class's punitive damages
claim."' 5 6 Specifically, the court explained that
[s]ince the State [of Florida] had no right to pursue [the] type[] of private
interests [involved in Engle] on behalf of its citizens, the punitive damages
claims settled by the State in the [Florida Settlement Agreement between
Florida and the tobacco companies], if any, were distinct from the punitive
damages sought by the Engle Class. 1
57
civil rights leaders Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, appealed to the jury's sense of outrage
for the injustices visited upon African-Americans in this country.
Id. at 44.
151. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 50-51. The Third District found that the cutoff
date for membership to the class was October 31, 1994 when the trial court originally certified
the class. However, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that the proper date was No-
vember 21, 1996 when the trial court recertified the class to include only Florida smokers,
pursuant to the Third District's direction. Id. at 53.
152. Id. at 50.
153. Id. at 51 (quoting Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 466 n.46
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), appd in part, quashed in part, rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,
2006)).
154. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 466.
155. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 51.
156. Id. at 19.
157. Id. at 17. The Supreme Court of Florida would not address the issue of whether the
trial court had erred by instructing the jury not to consider either the Florida Settlement
Agreement or the Master Settlement Agreement (between the states and tobacco companies)
with regard to the punitive damages issue as the Third District had found. Id. at 3.
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Despite its ruling that the Florida Tobacco Settlement did not preclude
such award, the Supreme Court of Florida would find three other reasons to
discard the $145 billion punitive damages award. '58
First, the court would hold "that the trial court erred in allowing the jury
to consider entitlement to punitive damages during the Phase I trial."' 5 9 The
court acknowledged that "an award of compensatory damages [was] not a
prerequisite to a finding of entitlement to punitive damages"161 since the two
types of damages serve different purposes. 16' However, the court empha-
sized that "a finding of liability [was] required before entitlement to punitive
damages [could] be determined, and that liability [was] more than a breach
of duty."' 162 The court noted that "[a]lthough [it] appeared to use 'breach of
duty' and 'liability' interchangeably in Ault v. Lohr,"'163 this really was not
the case and that an actual "finding of liability" was necessary before any
finding of entitlement to punitive damages."6 The Supreme Court of Florida
found that "the Phase I verdict did not constitute a 'finding of liability"' and
therefore that it had been "error for the Phase I jury to consider whether To-
bacco was liable for punitive damages."'
165
Second, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that "[e]ven if it were not
error to determine entitlement to punitive damages in Phase I, it was clear
error to allow the jury to go beyond mere entitlement and award class-wide
punitive damages when total compensatory damages had not been deter-
mined."' 166 In so ruling, the court acknowledged that it was deviating some-
what from Florida law, explaining as follows:
In the past, we have not discussed whether punitive dam-
ages awards must bear some reasonable relation to compensatory
damages. For example in Arab Termite & Pest Control of Florida,
158. See id. at 2.
159. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 19-20.
160. Id. at 70.
161. Id. at 20. The Supreme Court of Florida would rely on the following language from
the United States Supreme Court in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., to
explain the differences:
The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of
the defendant's wrongful conduct. The latter, which have been described as "quasi-criminal,"
operate as "private fines" intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing. A
jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination,
whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation.
Id. (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)).
162. Id. at21.
163. 538 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1989).
164. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 21.
165. Id. at23.
166. Id.
23
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Inc. v. Jenkins, 167 we stated that punitive damages "are to be meas-
ured by the enormity of the offense, entirely aside from the meas-
ure of compensation for the injured plaintiff." However, we now
hold, consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions after
Ault that recognize due process limits on punitive damages, that a
review of the punitive damages award includes an evaluation of
the punitive and compensatory amounts awarded to ensure a rea-
sonable relationship between the two. 1
68
Third, the court found "[t]he amount awarded [was] also clearly exces-
sive because it would bankrupt some of the defendants." 169 In this regard,
the court appears to rely on Florida law, not federal law in reaching this con-
clusion. 170 As the court would explain:
We [] conclude that the punitive damages award was clearly ex-
cessive under the limitation based on ability to pay established by
our precedent because it [was] "so inordinately large as obviously
to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which
the jury may properly operate." A comparison of the amounts
awarded and the financial worth assigned to each company by the
Engle Class's expert clearly demonstrate[d] that the award would
result in an unlawful crippling of the defendant companies. 17'
IV. STATE FARM S APPLICABILITY TO ENGLE
As described herein, State Farm has, in a short time frame, had quite an
impact on state court judgments awarding punitive damages, including the
record one in Engle. This is even more remarkable considering that the
United States Supreme Court's entry into this area has a relatively short his-
tory. Prior to 1996, the United States Supreme Court had never invalidated a
state court's punitive damages award as unreasonably large. 172 This was true
despite the Court having several opportunities. 1
73
167. 409 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1982).
168. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 24 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 19.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 27 n.8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993); Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989).
173. See id.
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The Court held that a punitive award was unconstitutionally excessive
for the first time in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. 114 In Gore, the
Court refused to sustain a $2 million punitive damages award in an Alabama
state case where there was only $4,000 in compensatory damages. 
75
It was in Gore where the United States Supreme Court first articulated
the three guide posts to identify unconstitutionally excessive punitive dam-
age awards. 176 The Court also "illuminate[d] 'the character of the standard
[to] identify [such] unconstitutionally excessive awards' of punitive dam-
ages"'' 77 explaining as follows:
Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a
State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and de-
terring its repetition. In our federal system, States necessarily have
considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive dam-
ages that they will allow in different classes of cases and in any
particular case .... Only when an award can fairly be categorized
as "grossly excessive" in relation to these interests does it enter the
zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 
178
Although it was prior to State Farm, at least one federal circuit has
opined that "[the] guidepost [sic] should neither be treated as an analytical
straitjacket nor deployed in the expectation that they will 'draw a bright line
marking the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive damages award,'
[as o]ther pertinent factors may from time to time enter into the equation."1
79
174. 517 U.s. 559, 584-86 (1996). In Gore, the purchaser of an automobile brought an
action against the distributor based on its failure to disclose that the automobile had been
repainted after being damaged. Id. at 563-64.
175. Id. at 578, 582. The jury had actually assessed $4 million in punitive damages but the
Supreme Court of Alabama would reduce it to $2 million because it "found that the jury im-
properly computed the amount of punitive damages by multiplying [plaintiff's] compensatory
damages by the number of similar [acts] in other jurisdictions," not just Alabama. Id. at 567.
176. See id. at 574-85.
177. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420
(1994)).
178. Id. (citations omitted).
179. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
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The fact that Engle was a class action 80 certainly should have been a
relevant consideration in determining whether the punitive award was
impermissibly excessive. However, not one of the cases cited by either the
Third District or the Supreme Court of Florida involved punitive damages in
the context of a class action, and those courts seem to largely ignore that
distinction.1 81 Moreover, since Engle was a mass tort action involving per-
sonal injuries, that fact, too, should have entered into any equation in review-
ing that punitive award relative to the Gore guide posts.'82 As one legal
scholar would observe around the time the Engle verdict was rendered,
"[v]irtually no mass tort case... ha[d] been tried to a jury." 183
The Third District would not engage in any analysis of the punitive
award utilizing the Supreme Court's guide posts, but simply cited to State
Farm for the proposition that the punitive award was excessive as a matter of
law. 18 4 The Supreme Court of Florida would also not engage in such analy-
sis, although it would rely on Gore's second guide post for its conclusion
that "compensatory damages must be determined" before any award of puni-
tive damages. 85  As noted, State Farm I mandates that a court evaluate a
punitive damages award in light of Gore's three guide posts.186 Applying
those guide posts to Engle, it is not at all clear that they would prohibit the
imposition of the historic punitive damages awarded in that case.
A. The First Guide Post
The United States Supreme Court in State Farm I repeated its statement
in Gore that, "'the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a puni-
180. According to the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc.:
[A] class action is a nontraditional litigation procedure permitting a representative with typical
claims to . . . stand in judgment for a class of similarly situated persons .... The purpose and
intent of class action[s] ... is to adjudicate and obtain resjudicata effect on all common issues
... not only to the representatives... but to all others who are "similarly situated."
703 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. 1997).
181. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 456-58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app"d in part, quashed in part, rem"d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
182. A "mass tort" can be defined as "tortious conduct affecting a large number of persons
[that] give[s] rise to a latent injury." R. Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing Statistics and Bell-
wether Trials in Mass Torts: What Do the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199, 201 (1999).
183. Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad. Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 20 (2001) [hereinafter Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad].
184. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 456.
185. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 25-26 (Fla. July
6, 2006).
186. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003)
(citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)).
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tive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
[mis]conduct."",17  Thereafter, the Court again described the five factors
relevant to this guide post. 88 One factor was whether "the harm caused was
physical as opposed to economic."'8 9 A second was whether "the target...
had [a] financial vulnerability."' 90 A third was whether "the tortious conduct
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of
others."'' A fourth was whether "the conduct involved repeated actions or
was an isolated incident."' 9 2 A fifth was whether "the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident." 93 There should be
little debate about the reprehensibility guide post and the fact that it was met.
1. Most Reprehensibility Factors Appear Present
The Court in State Farm I indicated that "[t]he existence of any one of
these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain
a punitive damages award."' 94 However, arguably almost all of the relevant
factors are present in Engle. 195  The named plaintiffs, and their class in
Engle, clearly alleged physical, rather than merely economic injury.'96 The
conduct of the tobacco defendants in Engle could certainly be said to
"evince[] an indifference to or a reckless disregard [for] the health [and]
safety of others," ' 7 if they knowingly sold the named plaintiffs, and their
class, a dangerous product.' 8 The situation in Engle definitely was not
about an isolated incident.' 99 Instead, it dealt with a repeated pattern of con-
duct on the part of the defendants' companies-selling cigarettes-that oc-
curred over many years. 200 This is not a situation where the harm caused
187. Id. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576).
190. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576).
191. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576).
192. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77).
193. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576).
194. Id. The Court also stated that "the absence of all of them renders any award suspect."
Id.
195. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 440-41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, remd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
196. See State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576); Engle IV, 853 So.
2d at 440.
197. Id.
198. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 440-41.
199. Id.
200. See id.
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could simply be considered a mere accident, and the jury verdict in Engle
seems to strongly suggest that the tobacco defendants engaged in deceit."0 '
2. Other Courts Found Most Reprehensibility
Additionally, the courts that have reviewed the awarding of punitive
damages in individual tobacco cases have found the reprehensibility guide
post met in those cases. 202 There appears to be no reason why Engle should
be any different.
3. State Farm Deficiencies Not Present
Moreover, the punitive award in Engle does not appear to suffer from
the same alleged deficiencies, in reference to the first guide post, as the one
in State Farm.20 3 In State Farm, the plaintiffs purportedly "reli[ed] upon
dissimilar and out-of-state conduct evidence" 2°4 that provided "scant evi-
dence of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured them., 25  Conse-
quently, according to the United States Supreme Court, this resulted in a
punitive damages award "that bore no relation to the [plaintiffs'] harm. 2 6
"In [State Farm], because the [plaintiffs] . . . show[ed] no conduct by [the
defendant] similar to that which harmed them, the conduct that harmed them
201. See id. at 450. As noted, during Phase 1 of the trial proceedings, the jury would
answer questions related to each legal theory alleged, which included claims for fraud and
conspiracy to commit fraud. See id. at 441, 450.
202. See Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 677 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Utiliz-
ing the five factors listed in State Farm, all show a high degree of reprehensibility and weigh
in favor of the jury's conclusion that a substantial punitive award was appropriate in this
case."); Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I), 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 71 (Ct. App. 2004) ("It..
. appears that allfive of the subfactors in [State Farm], point to a high degree of reprehensibil-
ity.") (emphasis in original); Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams III), 92 P.3d 126, 145
(Or. Ct. App. 2004) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive of more reprehensible misconduct for a
longer duration of time on the part of a supplier of consumer products to the Oregon public
than what occurred in this case."); see also Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 F.
Supp. 2d 1253, 1262 (D. Kan. 2002) (federal district judge "find[ing] that all of [the] factors
[relating to reprehensibility] point to a conclusion that [the tobacco manufacturer's] conduct
was highly blameworthy and deserving of significant punishment," in imposing a punitive
damage award of $15 million for an injured individual smoker).
203. See State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 420.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 423.
206. Id. at 422.
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[was] the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis. 20 7 While
the court in State Farm "[did] not suggest there was error in awarding puni-
tive damages [in that case] based upon [the defendant's] conduct toward the
[plaintiffs], a more modest punishment," based solely upon that conduct, was
warranted.0 8 In Engle, there is absolutely no indication in the opinion of
either the Third District Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Florida
that the plaintiffs in that case improperly used "dissimilar and out-of-state
conduct evidence" in securing their punitive damages award. 2 9  Further-
more, while the United States Supreme Court in State Farm found that the
punitive damage award in that case could not "be justified on the grounds
that [the defendant] was a recidivist, ' 210 the same is certainly not true in
Engle. 211
B. The Second Guide Post
Although the Third District Court of Appeal in Engle was not referring
to the second guide post-"the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award" 212-in particular, it
would stress that it was not possible to calculate the ratio between the puni-
tive and compensatory damages in that case at the time the punitive award
was rendered. 213 The Supreme Court of Florida would agree and specifically
state that the second guide post was "determinative" in regard to the exces-
24siveness issue. "4 The fact that it might not have been possible to calculate
the actual ratio between punitive and compensatory damages in Engle at the
207. Id. at 424.
208. See State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419-20.
209. Id. at 420; see Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle I), 853 So. 2d 434, 456-58 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app 'd in part, quashed in part, rem "d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
210. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 423.
211. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 451-58, 468-69. As the United States Supreme Court
explained, "a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender [because] ...
repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance."
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996).
212. State FarmI, 538 U.S. at 418.
213. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 451. As noted, the Supreme Court in State Farm had
stated that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages... will satisfy due process," and, in fact, "an award of more than four times the...
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety." State Farm
1, 538 U.S. at 425 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991)).
214. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 25 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
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time the jury returned the $145 billion punitive award may be true.215 That
fact alone, however, hardly seems a sufficient basis to discard such award for
a number of reasons.
1. Engle Involved Mass Tort Class
As noted earlier, the fact that Engle was a class action was certainly a
relevant factor that needed to be taken into consideration.2"6 By definition,
"[t]he class action is a representative action in which certain named parties
sue or are sued as representatives of a larger group of persons."2"7 In most
instances, "non-party members of the class need not be brought personally
before the [c]ourt."2" 8 Also noted earlier was the fact that Engle was not just
a class action, it was one in the mass tort context.219 The Supreme Court of
Florida case, Ault v. Lohr,22 ° which the court in Engle would state requires "a
finding of liability . ..before entitlement to punitive damages [could] be
determined, and that liability [was] more than a breach of duty, 221 was not a
class action.2 22 How such liability is to be established in the class suit is un-
clear. State Farm also was not a class action, 223 and in that case, the United
States Supreme Court also did not attempt to suggest how the ratio guide
post was to be applied in the context of a class action.24 The teachings in
both Ault and State Farm clearly were designed to apply to the traditional
one-on-one mode of litigation and not specifically to class actions.225 While
a class action should not alter the fact that liability must still be found and
compensatory damages be determined,226 the reality that a class action is
involved, as well as the nature of the case, cannot be simply ignored either.
215. SeeEngleIV,853 So. 2dat 45l.
216. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
217. David A. Sonenshein, Commentary, in U.S.C.S. COURT RULES, FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 23, at 9 (LexisNexis, Cumulative Supp. 2006).
218. United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98, 99 (D.D.C. 1976).
219. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
469, 539 (1994) (federal district court judge maintaining that "in mass tort cases.., the tradi-
tional one-on-one adversarial model of litigation does not apply [and that while] Ulustice does
hold true scales... it is not blind, nor should it be.").
220. 538 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1989).
221. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip. op. at 21 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
222. See Ault, 538 So. 2d at 455.
223. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm I), 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
224. See id. at 424-25
225. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
226. See Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip. op. at 21.
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This, however, seems to be what occurred in Engle. If Ault requires all of
the nonparty members of the class to be brought before the court at one time
to establish liability, is this a class action and, further, is this even possible?
Similarly, if State Farm requires that the amount of compensatory damages
for all nonparty members be determined before punitive damages can be
awarded to the class as a whole, will this, in reality, foreclose the possibility
of punitive damages from ever being awarded in a class action? Obviously,
since the Supreme Court of Florida issued the ruling in Ault, it was in the
best position to explain how its holding in that case was to be applied to the
class context.227 The fact that it did not attempt to do so is most troubling.
While the Supreme Court of Florida may not have been in the same position
to reconcile State Farm as it was with Ault, it is important to understand that
its conclusion-that the ratio guide post precluded the punitive award 221-
was based not on the fact that it found that the ratio guide post was not met,
but simply because the ratio calculation could not be performed at the time
the award was rendered.229 Whether State Farm demands such an outcome
in any case (not just a class action) seems far from certain 23 but if it does,
then this ratio guide post is far and away the most important guide post, de-
spite the repeated pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court in
State Farm that the first guide post, reprehensibility, is the most important. 2
3
'
2. This Was Engle's Trial Plan
The trial plan in Engle specifically was designed to determine the puni-
tive damages before determining the compensatory damages owed to the
227. See Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1989).
228. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 426.
229. See supra note 212-13 and accompanying text.
230. As noted earlier, one federal circuit court has stated that the guide posts are not to "be
treated as an analytical straitjacket." See supra note 179 and accompanying text. If the ratios
are supposedly not "binding" and only "instructive," how can the inability to perform the ratio
be conclusive that a punitive award must be discarded? See State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 425-26.
The courts clearly have not totally discarded punitive damages simply because there were no
civil or criminal sanctions to which such awards could be compared in accordance with
Gore's third guide post. See Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 683 (Ct. App,
2005) (upholding punitive award despite finding no "convincing analogous civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct"); Williams v. Philip Morris Inc.
(Williams 111), 92 P.3d 126, 145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding punitive award despite find-
ing "that [the state of] Oregon [did] not provide civil sanctions for [the] defendant's conduct
and that the criminal statutes that plaintiff [had] mentioned were not truly comparable").
231. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
575 (1996)).
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class as a whole.2 32 In the past, trial plans had been approved where punitive
damages were determined before compensatory damages.233  Further, sepa-
rating out common issues as to all class members for the jury to first deter-
mine, as was done during Phase 1 of the trial in Engle, is nothing new.234
While the Third District would acknowledge that it had approved the class
certification, it would emphasize that the trial court had made its trial plan
after such approval.235 Notwithstanding such a disclaimer by the Third Dis-
trict, the trial plan in Engle would seem to have been within the trial court's
inherent power under Florida law to control and manage the process of litiga-
tion before it. Florida courts have the "inherent power to do all things that
are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of
[their] jurisdiction, subject to valid existing laws and constitutional provi-
sions. 236 Moreover, there does not appear to be any Florida authority that
existed prior to Engle's $145 billion punitive award suggesting that punitive
232. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 441 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003), app"d in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
233. See, e.g., Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1018, 1023 (5th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that trial plan in mass-tort class action was not invalid on the ground that the plan called
for the jury to determine punitive damage liability and then to determine compensatory dam-
ages for the class members); Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going,
Gone? 98 F.R.D. 323, 332-33 (1983) (federal district court judge recommending trial plan in
mass tort case very similar to the one adopted by the trial court in Engle).
234. See, e.g., In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 464 (D. Wyo. 1995); see also
Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 184, 186 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming
conditional class certification in an asbestos-related property damage case of a nationwide
class to determine common issues relating to the characteristics of the asbestos products at
issue, the defendants' knowledge of asbestos health hazards, and whether the defendants'
conduct justified a punitive damages award).
235. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441.
236. Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1978). See also Moossun v.
Orlando Reg'l Health Care, 826 So. 2d 945, 954 (Fla. 2002) (Lewis, J., dissenting). As the
Supreme Court of Florida has explained: "Inherent power has to do with the incidents of
litigation, control of the court's process and procedure, control of the conduct of its officers
and the preservation of order and decorum with reference to its proceedings." In re Petition of
Fla. Bar, 61 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1952). In addition, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
particularly Rules 1.200, 1.220, 1.270, 1.280 and 1.380, contain numerous express grants of
authority that supplement a Florida court's inherent power to manage litigation. Further, the
Third District in Engle IV cited to the Manual for Complex Litigation, which serves as an
important judicial reference for complex litigation in state and federal court. Engle IV, 853
So. 2d at 455 n.24 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.27 (1995)). The
Manual encourages an active role by the judiciary in developing an effective trial plan as well
as recognizes "[t]he need for special judicial management of mass torts." MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § § 10.13, 22.1 (2004).
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damages in a multi-stage class action could only be made after all of the
compensatory damages were determined." 7
3. Florida's Lawsuit Against Big Tobacco
Although technically the State of Florida's lawsuit against the tobacco
companies seeking reimbursement for Medicaid expenditures may not have
been a class action, the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Agency for
Health Care Administration v. Associated Industries of Florida, Inc., 238 relat-
237. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 451. The Third District cited to a Florida attorney general
opinion stating that "[i]n the absence of any determination of the extent of compensatory
damages, the court lacks a standard by which it can judge whether an assessment of punitive
damages is reasonable or is 'grossly excessive."' Id. (quoting 00-21 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 76,
78 (2000)). This opinion, however, was not only issued after the Engle punitive award was
rendered, but in direct response to it. 00-21 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 76 (2000). The Florida attor-
ney general, of course, had brought Florida's lawsuit against the tobacco makers resulting in
the Florida Tobacco Settlement. Could that fact have played a role in the position he would
take? At least one critic of the States' settlement with the cigarette makers has opined that it
has resulted in the states becoming "full partners with the tobacco industry." Timothy E.
Brooks, Editorial, Tobacco Settlement: First Step or Misstep? Tobacco Industry Is the Win-
ner, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 11, 1998, at 17B; see also Editorial, Addicted to Tobacco,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2003, at A8. One could argue that this was later illustrated when thirty-
seven states and United States territories would sign an amicus brief asking the trial court in
an Illinois case to reduce the appeal bond for a cigarette manufacturer who had been found
liable for $10.1 billion in a class action. Christina Cheddar Berk, Altria Backed on Appeal
Bond, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2003, at B4. The cigarette manufacturer had apparently warned
that requiring it to post the bond might cause it to seek bankruptcy protection and suspend
payments to the state governments under the 1998 tobacco settlement. See Gordon Fairclough
& Vanessa O'Connell, Altria 's CEO Faces a Pack of Problems, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2003,
at B1. The states appear to have been clearly concerned that the manufacturer's payments to
them under the tobacco settlement were at risk. Could the Florida Attorney General have had
similar concerns about the Engle punitive award's impact on the Florida Tobacco Settlement?
238. 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996). Medicaid is "[a] form of public assistance sponsored
jointly by the federal and state governments providing medical aid [including nursing home
care] for people whose income falls below a certain level." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 981
(6th ed. 1990). The intended role of Medicaid is to "be the payor of last resort." See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 409.910(1) (2006) ("It is the intent of the Legislature that Medicaid be the payor
of last resort for medically necessary goods and services furnished to Medicaid recipients.");
Shweiri v. Commonwealth, 622 N.E.2d 612, 614 (Mass. 1993) ("[The] ultimate goal of Medi-
caid [is] that the program 'be the payer of last resort, that is, other available resources must be
used before Medicaid pays for the care of an individual enrolled in the Medicaid program."').
Consequently, Medicaid requires states to take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal
liability of third parties to pay for care or services available under Medicaid and, where legal
liability is found, to seek reimbursement for such assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)
(1994).
33
Reeder: Engle, State Farm, Florida Law, and Punitive Damages: Was the $14
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LA W REVIEW
ing to that lawsuit cannot be ignored. Shortly before Florida brought its suit,
the Florida Legislature amended Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability
Act, making it easier for the State to file and prove any recoupment
claims.239 Prior to the amendment, Florida was limited to recovering Medi-
caid expenses using the traditional method of subrogation, meaning that
since it would be standing in the shoes of the injured party, it would be sub-
ject to any defenses that the defendant would have against the injured
party.240 The amended legislation created a new cause of action that was
independent of any right or claim of a Medicaid recipient.24' It was also un-
usual in that it appeared to allow the State to proceed under any theory of
recovery. 242 The amended legislation also provided the State with certain
additional advantages: 1) It allowed the State to bring a lawsuit that is very
similar to a class action; 243 2) it allowed the State to pursue such action
against a third party, or aggregate third parties without identifying each indi-
vidual member of the class; 24 3) it prevented such third parties from assert-
ing defenses such as assumption of risk and comparative fault;245 4) it al-
lowed the State to pursue its claim under both the market share liability the-
ory, 246 as well as the joint and several liability theory; 247 5) it allowed the
State to use statistical analysis in proving its case against third parties; 248 and
6) it allowed the State to sue on claims that had already been extinguished by
the passage of time, by abolishing the statute of repose defense in such
suits.249 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled on a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act in Agency for
Health Care Administration, and largely upheld the Act.250 The court ruled
that the State could properly bring an action under the Act's statutory author-
239. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(6)(a) n.5 (1995).
240. See Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1244 (discussing the history of the
1994 amendment to the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act). See also Philip C. Patterson &
Jennifer M. Philpott, Note, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity
Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 549, 561 (2000).
241. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(6)(a) (1995); Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d
at 1248, 1250.
242. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(1) (1995). "Common-law theories of recovery shall be
liberally construed to accomplish this intent." Id.
243. See id. § 409.910(9).
244. Id. § 409.910(9)(a).
245. See id § 409.910(1).
246. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9)(b).
247. Id. § 409.910(1) (1995).
248. Id. § 409.910(9).
249. Id. § 409.910(12)(h).
250. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239,
1256-57 (Fla. 1996).
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ity, but that the Act only applied to causes of action that accrued after the
effective date of the amendments to the Act. 251 The court also held that the
elimination of affirmative defenses under the Act was not facially unconsti-
tutional as a violation of due process, 252 since new causes of action do not
have to offer defendants all of the usual defenses and there is no absolute
prohibition against the elimination of all affirmative defenses. 253 The court
further upheld the joinder of claims in order to promote judicial efficiency,254
as well as the use of statistical evidence to prove causation. 255 The court,
however, did find that the provision granting the State authority to pursue an
action without identifying individual Medicaid recipients must be stricken as
encroaching on due process rights.2 56 In addition, the court modified the
State's abolition of the statute of repose such that Florida could not resurrect
a claim that was already time barred when the Act was amended. 257 Fur-
thermore, the court held that the State must use either a theory of market
share liability or joint and several liability, but not both. 58 Clearly, the Su-
preme Court of Florida would allow the State of Florida a good deal of flexi-
bility in presenting its case against Big Tobacco.259
4. Third District's Prior Broin Case
The Third District's prior decision in Broin v. Philip Morris Co.,260 es-
tablished the background for what would occur in Engle, although it did not
involve an award of punitive damages. In Broin, a class action was
brought against tobacco companies, and the class was represented by the
same plaintiffs' counsel as in Engle IV. 262 The class in Broin, however, did
not consist of smokers, but of nonsmoking flight attendants that were alleg-
edly injured by secondhand smoke. 63 After the trial court granted the to-
251. See id. at 1250.
252. Id. at 1251.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 1255.
255. See Agencyfor Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d. at 1250.
256. Id. at 1254.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1255-56.
259. See id.
260. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
261. See id. at 889.
262. Compare id. at 889, with Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 440
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July
6, 2006).
263. Broin, 641 So. 2d at 889.
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bacco companies' motion to dismiss the class' allegations, the Third District
reversed and remanded the case with an order to reinstate them.26 In so do-
ing, the Third District found that the case raised common issues as to all
class members and listed the following as examples:
(1) How much exposure to secondhand smoke causes disease?
(2) Whether and when the tobacco industry knew that exposure to
secondhand smoke caused injury?
(3) Whether studies conducted by the tobacco industry provide in-
formation about the dangers of secondhand smoke?
(4) Whether the tobacco industry misrepresented data on second-
hand smoking hazards and conspired to distort such information?
(5) Whether the tobacco industry has a duty to warn nonsmokers
that exposure to passive cigarette smoke could cause serious health
problems?265
The Third District also made certain other key rulings in Broin: 1) that
"[P]laintiffs' legal claims need not be completely identical; ' 266 2) that
"[d]ifferences among the class members as to applicable statutes of limita-
tions [did] not require dismissal of [the] class action;, 267 3) that even though
different choice of law provisions might govern, that did not defeat class
certification; 268 and 4) that "[e]ntitlement to different amounts of damages
[was] not fatal to [the] class action., 269  Upon remand, the trial com-
menced 270 and the parties eventually reached a settlement. 27 ' The Supreme
264. Id. at 892.
265. Id. at 890. The Third District noted "that the common issues [were] potentially dis-
positive of the case. If defendants prevail[ed] on [those] issues, the individual claims [would]
be rendered moot." Id.
266. Id.
267. Broin, 641 So. 2d at 891.
268. Id. at 891 n.2.
269. Id. at 891. The court noted that subclasses could be utilized to address many of these
items if they presented a problem. See id. at 891 n.2.
270. One observer noted that Broin "was historic for being the first class action to reach
trial against the tobacco industry." Brian H. Barr, Note, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds: The Im-
proper Assessment of Punitive Damages for an Entire Class of Injured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 787, 805 (2001).
271. Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 743 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Under the settlement agreement the tobacco makers agreed, inter alia, to "support Federal
legislation that would impose a smoking ban on all international flights . . . and establish a
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Court of Florida's criticism of the Third District's change in position regard-
ing class certification seems even more justified in light of Broin.272
5. Possible Solution to "Overkill" Problem?
The Supreme Court of Florida has specifically rejected the argument
that punitive damages should be barred in mass tort cases to prevent "over-
kill," which presumably would result from "multiple punitive damage
awards against a single defendant for the same course of conduct., 273  It
seems that there is not any reason to take a different position with respect to
an award of punitive damages in a class action. In fact, many have endorsed
class actions as a solution to the problems resulting from multiple punitive
damages awards.274 Some have even gone further and suggested use of a
$300 million settlement fund to endow a foundation to sponsor scientific research for early
detection and cure of diseases of flight attendants caused by cigarette smoke." Id. The indi-
vidual class members would not be entitled to any monies under the terms of the settlement
agreement, but would "retain the right to bring individual claims for compensatory damages
[and not punitive damages which were waived] on any theory of liability other than fraud,
misrepresentation, or any other willful or intentional conduct." Id.
272. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 31 (Fla. July
6, 2006). "Invalidating the completed class action proceedings on manageability and superi-
ority grounds after a trial has occurred does not accord with common sense or logic." Id.
273. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1994). The term "overkill"
was first used by the Second Circuit in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832,
839 (2d Cir. 1967). According to one California appellate court, "every appellate court in the
nation to consider the argument that punitive damages should be barred in mass tort cases to
prevent 'overkill' has rejected the idea." Stevens v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 525, 541-42 (Ct. App. 1996). Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kentucky observed
"the [United States] Supreme Court has been afforded numerous opportunities to address the
issue [of duplicative punitive damages in the context of a mass tort] and, to date, has declined
to do so." Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Ky. 1998). It
would be noted that in addition to "overkill", the term "windfall" describes another problem
with adjudicating punitive damage awards in individual suits. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 59 (1979) (Blackman, J., concurring). It refers to the arbitrariness of such
awards, since juries are usually accorded "broad discretion both as to the imposition and
amount of such damages." Id. at 50. It also refers to the situation in which giving punitive
awards to early plaintiffs will risk the possibility that later plaintiffs will not be able to obtain
compensatory damages from that same defendant. See Dunn v. HOVIC, I F.3d 1371, 1394-
95 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., dissenting) (noting that the dispensing of punitive damages has
resulted in the "increased ... likelihood that future claimants will not be able to recover for
their injuries").
274. Both the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute have endorsed
class action lawsuits as the best solution to the multiple punitive damages problem. See 2
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
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"mandatory class action" on the issue of punitive damages in mass tort
cases. 275
INJURY: APPROACHES To LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 260-65, 412-39 (1991); AM-
ERICAN BAR ASS'N, REVISED FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMM'N ON MASS
TORTS 54-55 (1989). So too have others. See generally Semra Mesulam, Note, Collective
Rewards and Limited Punishment: Solving the Punitive Damages Dilemma with Class, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1140-41 (2004) (suggesting that "[tihe punitive damages class is the
only mechanism that can, within the constraints of constitutional process, protect the rights
and interests of both plaintiffs and defendants"); Howard A. Denemark, Seeking Greater
Fairness When Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by a Defen-
dant, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 967 (2002) ("The problem [of multiple awards] simply disappears
if all plaintiffs are joined into one class action."); Richard A. Nagareda, Punitive Damage
Class Actions and the Baseline of Tort, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 943, 944, 955-57 (2001)
(stating that class actions are the best solution to the multiple punitive damages problem);
Jonathan Hadley Koenig, Note, Punitive Damage "Overkill" After TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources: The Need for a Congressional Solution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 751,
782 (1995) (stating that "only comprehensive class action reform promises a significantly
more fair and more rational approach to the adjudication of punitive damage claims in mass
tort litigation"); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF
THE COMMITrEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 20-26 (1989)
(proposing class actions as the remedy to multiple punitive damages awards); J.K. Ivey, Puni-
tive Damages in Mass Product Liability Cases: Hope for Reform? 6 REv. LITIG. 69,91 (1987)
(stating that "a class determination of punitive awards" in federal courts is viable after Jen-
kins); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 102 (1985) (noting that "a class action [for puni-
tive damages] lessens the risk of overkill because a single resolution of the punitive damages
issue enables the judge and jury to carefully consider the matter and award the total amount
necessary to both punish the defendant and deter others"); Note, Class Actions for Punitive
Damages, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1788 (1983) (asserting that a class action is the best way to
resolve mass-tort punitive damage claims).
275. See In re Exxon Valdez (Exxon Valdez 1), 229 F. 3d 790, 795-96 (9th Cir. 2000).
According to the Ninth Circuit, "[m]andatory class actions avoid the unfairness that results
when a few plaintiffs-those who win the race to the courthouse-bankrupt a defendant early
in the litigation process. They also avoid the possible unfairness of punishing a defendant
over and over again for the same tortious conduct." Id.; see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser &
Thomas M. Sobol, Equity for the Victims, Equity for the Transgressor: The Classwide Treat-
ment of Punitive Damages Claims, 74 TUL. L. REV. 2005, 2031 (2000) ("The certification of a
mandatory class with respect to punitive damages claims [will] insure[] defendants that the
ultimate award... will ... be proportional to the course of conduct at issue ... [and that it]
will be distributed equitably among the affected class."); Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive
Damage Awards, 39 VILL. L. REV. 433, 446 (1994) ("[O]nly ... the mandatory class action,
provides a vehicle with which to control multiple punitive damage awards."); Briggs L. Tobin,
Comment, The "Limited Generosity" Class Action and a Uniform Choice of Law Rule: An
Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive Damage Adjudication in the Federal
Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457, 465 (1989).
A class action approach to the adjudication of mass-tort punitive damage claims both
preserves the benefits underlying the doctrine of punitive damages and solves the prob-
lems caused by individual adjudication of these claims .. .[but] the class must be a
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6. Jenkins Shows No Federal Infirmity
The trial court plan in Engle does not appear to suffer from any type of
constitutional infirmity under federal law as well.276 Although Jenkins v.
Raymark Industries, Inc. 277 was decided prior to State Farm, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the argument that under either federal or Texas law, punitive dam-
ages could not be determined separately from actual damages in a class ac-
tion.278 The case involved a class of plaintiffs with asbestos-related claims
who brought an action against thirteen different defendants.279 The Federal
Appeals Court refused to accept the defendants' argument that the culpability
of their conduct needed to be evaluated relative to each plaintiff, explaining
as follows:
The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the victim but
to create a deterrence to the defendant, and to protect the public interest.
The focus is on the defendant's conduct, rather than on the plaintiffs.
While no plaintiff may receive an award of punitive damages without
proving that he suffered actual damages, the allocation need not be made
concurrently with an evaluation of the defendant's conduct. The relative
timing of these assessments is not critical. 8°
mandatory class binding upon all members of the class regardless of whether they have
joined in the proceeding.
Id; see also Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDiHAM L. REv. 37, 91-92 (1983) (rec-
ommending mandatory punitive damage class actions and discussing circumstances where
they are most appropriate); C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Peter M. Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of
Class Members Who Opt-Out: Should They Survive? 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 40 (1981) (recom-
mending that plaintiffs who opt out of class action should not be able to assert subsequent
individual punitive damage claim).
276. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app 'd inpart, quashed inpart, rem "d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
277. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
278. Id. at 474.
279. Id. at 469.
280. Id. at 474 (citations omitted). For the appellate court, the trial court's "plan [was]
clearly superior" to re-litigating the same issue over many times. Id. at 473.
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7. Class Reps Were Awarded Compensatories
Prior to State Farm, federal law also did not appear to prohibit an award
of punitive damages in a class action where representative class members
were awarded compensatory damages with such punitive damages. The
Sixth Circuit made its position clear in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.281
that, "[a trial] court need not defer its award of punitive damages prior to
determining compensatory damages for the entire class ... [s]o long as the
court determines the defendant's liability and awards representative class
members compensatory damages." '282 If so, was there a problem in Engle
where representative class members were awarded compensatory damages
along with the award of punitive damages?
8. State Farm's Impact Seems Questionable
To suggest that State Farm prohibits a class claim for punitive damages
seems most questionable. As noted, State Farm was not a class action nor
did the United States Supreme Court even attempt to address how its teach-
ings were to be applied in that context. Further, at least one court has already
rejected the argument that State Farm precludes a class claim for punitive
damages.283 In Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,284 the federal district court
rejected such contention explaining as follows:
[Defendant] also argues that [p]laintiffs' class claim for punitive
damages is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123
S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed. 2d 585 (2003). Nothing in State Farm,
however, supports this supposition. In State Farm the Court held
that a punitive damage award in an individual action improperly
punished the defendant for conduct that "bore no relation to the
[plaintiff's] harm." Id. at 422, 123 S.Ct. 1513. Specifically, it
found that the jury improperly considered conduct by [the defen-
281. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
282. Id. at 1217.
283. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 172 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Dukes in-
volved the largest employment discrimination class action in American history, consisting of
at least 1.5 million women in the putative class. Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation: To
(b)(2) or not to (b)(2)?, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 2004, at 12.
284. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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dant] that occurred in other states and did not directly affect the
plaintiff. Id. at 422-23, 123 S.Ct. 1513. As such, it underscored
the basic proposition that a "defendant should be punished for the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory indi-
vidual or business." Id. at 423, 123 S.Ct. 1513. Such a principle is
not, as [defendant] suggests, incompatible with the recovery of pu-
nitive damages in a class action.
First, courts can ensure that any award of punitive dam-
ages to the class is based solely on evidence of conduct that was
directed toward the class. Second, as [p]laintiffs propose here,
courts can limit recovery of any punitive damages to those class
members who actually recover an award of [damages], and thus
can demonstrate that they were in fact personally harmed by the
defendant's conduct. Finally, courts also can ensure that any puni-
tive damage award is allocated among the ... class in reasonable
proportion to individual [damages] awards. Accordingly, this
Court is satisfied that procedures exist that permit [p]laintiffs' pu-
nitive damage claim to be managed in a manner fully consistent
with the principles of State Farm.
2 85
9. Individualized Entitlement to Punitive Damages?
In Engle IV, the Third District's pronouncement that "[t]he defendants
[were] entitled to a jury determination, on an individualized basis, as to
whether and to what extent each particular class member [was] entitled to
receive punitive damages" is most questionable.2 86 Although the Supreme
Court of Florida would not specifically state this, some undoubtedly will say
that its action in discarding the punitive award suggests as such. This might
285. Id. at 172. But cf In re Simon II Litig. (Simon I1), 407 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 2005).
Simon II suggests that State Farm demands:
In certifying a class that seeks an assessment of punitive damages prior to an actual determi-
nation and award of compensatory damages,... [a class] [c]ertification [o]rder... [must] ensure
that ajury will be able to assess an award that, in the first instance, will bear a sufficient nexus
to the actual and potential harm to the plaintiff class, and that will be reasonable and propor-
tionate to those harms.
Id. According to one litigant, State Farm may have "unintentionally strengthened the pros-
pects for class certification of issues relating to punitive damages" since the guide posts "fo-
cus primarily on defendants' conduct and self-consciously strive to systematize the determina-
tion of punitive damages in all courts and cases." Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action
Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1475, 1507 (2005).
286. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003), app 'd in part, quashed in part, rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
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287be a legitimate argument if referring to compensatory damages. However,
does it apply to punitive damages? 288  As the Fifth Circuit in Jenkins had
stated, punitive damages are not meant to compensate the victim; they are
designed to vindicate the public interest.289 Awarding punitive damages to
private citizens is justified as a necessary incentive to accomplish the goals
of punishing a defendant who has engaged in outrageous conduct, and deter-
ring that defendant-as well as others-from engaging in such misconduct in
the future. 290 The fact that courts have recognized the legitimacy of certify-
ing a class solely for punitive-and not compensatory--damages 291 is
287. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319-21 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
district court's trial plan as inconsistent with state law because it did not entail an individual
inquiry into each member's actual damages).
288. Again, wouldn't this defeat one of the primary benefits of bringing a class action, if
the Third District is correct and individual determinations were required? See Maenner v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 127 F.R.D. 488, 491 (W.D. Mich. 1989) ("Defendants' proposal
... that all issues of liability and damages be tried together ... would effectively defeat the
class-action treatment of this case.").
289. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986). This is true
under Florida law as well since the "[award of] punitive damages is for the public benefit or
collective good ... [and] will reflect not the wrong done to any single individual but the
wrongfulness of the conduct as a whole." Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1295
(11 th Cir. 1999) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1986)); Tapscott
v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1996)); see also Arab Termite &
Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (Fla. 1982). Punitive damages are
to be determined "entirely aside from the measure of compensation for the injured plaintiff."
Id.
290. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 416
(2003). "Compensatory damages are 'intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff
has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct' while "punitive damages serve a
broader function ... aimed at deterrence and retribution." Id. (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)). Punitive damages "are private fines
levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 468 ("The
plaintiffs, as private parties, do not have a 'right' to punitive damages; punitive damages are
awarded solely as a matter of public rights or interests, in order to serve the public policy of
punishment and deterrence.").
291. See In re Exxon Valdez (Exxon Valdez I1), 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079-80, 1082 (D.
Alaska 2004) (The court certified a "single, punitive damages claims class" relating to an oil
spill that allegedly caused economic losses and emotional injuries, which eventually resulted
in a $5 billion jury verdict.); see also Williams, supra note 233, at 332-36 (judge defending
his decision to certify a nationwide punitive damage class action in In re Northern District of
California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation (Dalkon Shield I), 526 F. Supp.
887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A. H. Robins
Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983)); see generally In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725
F.2d 858-59, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1067 (1984) (denying mandamus
petition to vacate certification of two classes, one on issues of punitive damages, in case
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clearly reflective of the fact that such individual determinations are not con-
sidered to be required with respect to them.292
10. Individualized Proof of Punitive Damages?
Tenth, it is also clear that courts have approved various methods of de-
termining compensatory damages on the basis of class-wide, as opposed to
individualized, proof of damages. 293 In so doing, the courts rejected the de-
where plaintiffs claimed to have suffered damages as a result of exposure to herbicides manu-
factured by the defendant).
292. As one legal scholar would observe shortly after State Farm I:
Because the purpose of punitive damages is to punish defendants for egregious conduct and
deter similar behavior in the future, the typical punitive damages analysis focuses predomi-
nantly on characteristics of the defendant, such as the nature of the defendant's wrongful con-
duct, the nature and extent of harm the defendant has caused, and the defendant's financial
condition. Historically, the characteristics of the plaintiff have played a minor role at best. In-
deed, in the class action context, a claim for punitive damages might not vary at all-either in
the evidence that was presented or in the size of the award-based on the absence or presence
of any individual class member. From this vantage point, the claim appears to be collective
because the award yields relief to the group, based on the defendant's conduct to the group,
rather than to any particular individual.
Steven S. Gensler, Diversity Class Actions, Common Relief and the Rule of Individual Valu-
ation, 82 OR. L. REV. 295, 312-13 (2003) (citations omitted). Although the scholar noted that
State Farm I "may alter" the plaintiff's "minor role" in determining punitive damages, does
there really seem to be any justification for this? See id. at 313 n.88. As noted, many have
argued that punitive damages in mass tort cases should be subject to class action treatment
because of the inherent unfairness that often results in the normal case-by-case method of
adjudication when determining such damages. See supra notes 274-75. "A jury's assessment
of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposi-
tion of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation." Engle v. Liggett
Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 20 (Fla. July 6, 2006) (quoting Cooper
Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 432); see Christopher J. Willis, Aggregation of Punitive Damages in
Diversity Class Actions: Will the Real Amount in Controversy Please Stand Up? 30 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 775, 795-99 (1997) (arguing that punitive damages sought for a class of plain-
tiffs are common and undivided interests justifying aggregation of such damages for purposes
of determining the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction).
293. See Catlett v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1267 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1291 (D.C. Cir.
1984). In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury award of approximately
$766 million to a class where a random sample of compensatory damage claims were used to
determine such damages. 103 F.3d 767, 772, 787 (9th Cir. 1996). In a case similar to Engle,
In re Simon 11 Litig., the district court made various forms of sampled evidence, including
statistical proof of both causation and damages, an integral part of its trial plan in a nationwide
class action comprising all persons who smoked defendants' cigarettes and who were diag-
nosed with certain enumerated diseases within the class period. 211 F.R.D. 86, 99-100, 113
(E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005). As noted, Florida's lawsuit against
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fendants' argument that they have a right to an individual determination of
such damages.294 The Third District's holding in Engle IV, that the tobacco
defendants had a right to an individualized determination with respect to
punitive damages, is therefore questionable from this perspective as well. 295
Further, should a wrongdoer be able to avoid punitive damages simply be-
cause the harm it caused may have been difficult to prove or value? This is
clearly not the case with respect to compensatory damages.29 6 Under Florida
law, any "difficulty in proving [compensatory] damages or uncertainty as to
[their] amount will not prevent recovery" 297 "where it is clear that substantial
damages were suffered and there is a reasonable basis in evidence for the
amount awarded., 298  Other jurisdictions have come to similar conclu-
sions.29 9 One rationale is that a wrongdoer is not able to escape liability sim-
the tobacco companies was, in essence, a class action, and both the Florida Legislature and the
Supreme Court of Florida approved of the use of statistical evidence being used in that case.
See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9)(b) (1995) (section omitted pursuant to Fla. HB 3077, § 1 (1997));
see Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1256 (Fla.
1996).
294. See Long v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. I11. 1991)
("[T]o the extent defendant argues in this case that ... it has an absolute right to individual-
ized determinations of damages, its contention must be rejected as contrary to the case law
and to the policies governing class actions."); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
278, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("[T]he court cannot conclude that the defendants are constitution-
ally entitled to compel a parade of individual plaintiffs to establish damages.").
295. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006) ("The
defendants are entitled to a jury determination, on an individualized basis."). Further, would it
be constitutionally impermissible to use some method to determine the ratio of compensato-
ries to punitives in a class action based on other than individual proof of such damages?
296. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Schimpf v.
Reger, 691 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Adams v. Dreyfus Interstate Dev.
Corp., 352 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); BE&K Constr. Co. v. Will & Grundy
Counties Bldg. Trades Council, 156 F.3d 756, 770 (7th Cir. 1998); Sir Speedy, Inc. v. L & P
Graphics, Inc., 957 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1992); Broan Mfg. Co. v. Assoc. Distrib., Inc.,
923 F.2d 1232, 1240 (6th Cir. 1991); Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter, 34 F.2d 589, 592 (10th
Cir. 1929); Long-Lewis, Inc. v. Webster, 551 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Ala. 1989); Romer v. Dist.
of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097, 1100 (D.C. 1982); DeSombre v. Bickel, 118 N.W.2d 868, 873
(Wis. 1963); Weinglass v. Gibson, 155 A. 439, 440 (Pa. 1931); Uhrich Millwork, Ltd. v. J.B.
Brewster Co., 261 P. 561, 562 (Kan. 1927).
297. Schimpf 691 So. 2d at 580.
298. Adams, 352 So. 2d at 78.
299. See Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264; BE&K Constr. Co., 156 F.3d at 770; Sir Speedy, Inc.,
957 F.2d at 1038; Broan Mfg. Co., 923 F.2d at 1240; Hoffer Oil Corp., 34 F.2d at 592; Long-
Lewis, Inc., 551 So. 2d at 1027; Romer, 449 A.2d at 1100; DeSombre, 118 N.W.2d at 873;
Weinglass, 155 A. at 440; Uhrich Millwork, Ltd., 261 P. at 562.
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ply because the harm caused is difficult to prove or value. 300  Could that
logic have any application to a punitive damage award? Should a wrongdoer
be able to avoid a punitive damage award simply because the harm it may
have caused was so great that it either was impossible to determine or might
take years to ascertain?
11. What Is Really Proper Analysis?
As one federal district court observed, "the proper analysis is not always
simply a comparison of punitive damages to the amount of compensatory
damages actually awarded by the jury."3 0 ' In Gore, the United States Su-
preme Court reiterated that "the proper inquiry is 'whether there is a reason-
able relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to
result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has oc-
curred."' 30 2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of California, in Simon v. San
Paolo U.S. Holding Co.,303 suggested that the Gore inquiry still holds true,
even after State Farm L 304 California's highest court explained that in State
Farm I "the [United States Supreme] [C]ourt referred to the relationship be-
tween punitive damages and both 'the amount of harm' and 'the general
damages recovered,' impliedly recognizing that these two are not always
identical. 30 5 The Supreme Court of California also noted that in "discussing
300. See Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264-65; Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); BE&K Constr. Co., 156 F.3d at 770; Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106,
1118 (2d Cir. 1986).
301. lannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 403, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
302. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (emphasis omitted)). In TXO, the jury
awarded the plaintiff $19,000 in compensatory damages for slander of title, plus $10 million
in punitive damages, roughly 526 times the compensatory damages award. 509 U.S. at 446.
Nonetheless, and despite its suggestion just two years earlier in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip that a 4 to 1 ratio was close to the line, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the award, holding that the punitive damages were not so "'grossly excessive' as to be
beyond the power of the State to allow." Id. at 462; see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 24 (1991). While the Court acknowledged the "dramatic disparity between the
actual [and punitive] damages," it concluded that "in light of the amount of money potentially
at stake, the bad faith of [the defendant], the fact that the scheme employed ... was part of a
larger pattern of fraud, trickery, and deceit, and [the defendant's] wealth," the punitive dam-
ages award did not violate due process. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 462.
303. 113 P.3d 63 (Cal. 2005).
304. Id. at 71 (discussing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538
U.S. 408 (2003)).
305. Id. (citing State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 426).
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the second [Gore] 'guide post,' the [nation's] high [C]ourt [in State Farm 1]
spoke repeatedly of a proportionality between punitive damages and the
harm or 'potential harm' suffered by the plaintiff. 30 6 According to the Su-
preme Court of California, "United States Supreme Court precedents [includ-
ing State Farm I] appear to contemplate, in some circumstances, the use of
measures of harm beyond the compensatory damages.' 7 As a result, "fed-
eral and state courts have, in a variety of factual contexts, considered un-
compensated or potential harm as part of the predicate for a punitive dam-
ages award. 30 8 The Supreme Court of California makes a convincing argu-
ment that, upon closer analysis, is actually supported by State Farm I, as well
as other Supreme Court precedents.3 °9 In evaluating the excessiveness of a
punitive award, the amount of the compensatory damages awarded may not
always be indicative of the harm caused; therefore, should courts consider
the potential harm as well?
310
12. Calculation Could Have Been Deferred
Finally, and probably most important, it is clear that a calculation of pu-
nitive damages could have been taken after all the compensatory damages
306. Id. (citing State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 418, 424).
307. Id.
308. San Paolo US. Holding Co., 113 P.3d at 71; see Gensler, supra note 292, at 342-43.
Gensler contends that "State Farm, like the previous decisions, does not specifically identify
what figure is to be the denominator in the ratio calculation[s]," while theorizing that it was
still possible that the denominator could be "the total harm the defendant caused or intended to
cause, or the defendant's total gain from a course of misconduct." Id. (emphasis omitted)
(footnote omitted). Furthermore, Catherine M. Sharkey, in a relevant article on punitive dam-
ages, argued that even though State Farm I states that:
"[A] defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised,
may not serve as the basis for punitive damages" . . . [and] in discussing the relationship "be-
tween harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award," the [United
States Supreme] Court seems to contemplate explicitly the use of "harm to the people of
Utah," at least in cases where such an "adverse effect on the State's general population" could
be shown.
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 362
(2003) (quoting State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 422-423, 424, 427) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
309. See San Paolo US. Holding Co., 113 P.3d at 71 (citing State Farm I, 538 U.S. at
418).
310. See In re Exxon Valdez (Exxon Valdez I1), 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (D. Alaska
2004). The court opined "that State Farm [I], while bringing the [Gore] guideposts into
sharper focus, does not change the analysis." Id.
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were determined.31' In fact, after the Phase 2 verdicts, a case involving a
sick smoker was allowed to proceed to trial in accordance with the Engle
trial plan, after which the jury awarded the smoker $37.5 million in compen-
satory damages.312 Although this case was thought to be a possible preview
of suits to come,3"3 it apparently was the only one. Such individual tobacco
cases, however, clearly have been allowed to proceed.31 4 Further, is not the
ruling by the Supreme Court of Florida in Engle VI in reality allowing such
individual tobacco cases to proceed, but simply without the bonus of the pu-
nitive damages award already determined.3' 5
C. The Third Guide Post
The third guide post is "the disparity between the punitive damages
award and the 'civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
311. See, e.g., Gordon Fairclough, Reynolds Ordered to Pay $15 Million-Scale of Puni-
tive Award Heightens Threat Lawsuits Pose to Tobacco Industry, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002,
at A6 [hereinafter Fairclough, Reynolds Ordered to Pay].
312. See Jay Weaver, Jury Awards Smoker $37.5 Million, MIAMI HERALD, June 12, 2002,
at lA.
313. Fairclough, Reynolds Ordered to Pay, supra note 311.
314. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle (Engle 1), 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1996). This clearly seems to be what the Third District contemplated in its original
opinion in Engle I, modifying the order certifying a nationwide class to "manageable propor-
tions" by restricting the class to Florida smokers. Id. In its opinion, the Third District recog-
nized that while "certain individual issues [would] have to be tried as to each class member,
principally the issue of damages, the basic issues of liability common to all members of the
class [would] clearly predominate over the individual issues." Id. at 41. Incidentally, Broin v.
Philip Morris Co. appears to support such an outcome, although it did not involve punitive
damages and was a settlement as opposed to a verdict. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1994). As noted, while the individual class members in that case were not entitled to any
money under the terms of the settlement agreement, they did, however, have the right to bring
individual claims. See Philip Morris Inc. v. French, 897 So. 2d 480, 483-84 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2004). A number of class members appear to have instituted their own suits following
the settlement in Broin. Id. ("Following the [Broin] settlement, over 3,000 flight attendants
brought individual suits against the tobacco defendants for the claims retained by the agree-
ment.").
315. Moreover, if there was true concern that the $145 billion punitive award would "frus-
trate the societal interest in protecting all injured claimants' rights to at least recover compen-
satory damages," as claimed by the Third District in Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV),
payment of the punitive damage award could have been stayed until the compensatory dam-
ages were determined and satisfied. 853 So. 2d 434, 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app 'd
in part, quashed in part, rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006); see Keene Corp. v. Levin,
623 A.2d 662, 663 (Md. 1993) (noting that trial courts in asbestos litigation had deferred
payments of punitive damages "until all Baltimore City plaintiffs' compensatory damages
[were] paid").
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cases."' 316 The real purpose of this guide post is to determine whether or not
the defendant has "fair notice" that the wrongful conduct entailed the result-
ing punitive award.31 Prior to the historical award in Engle it could be ar-
gued that the tobacco defendants in that case had "fair notice" from several
different avenues.
1. Punitive Awards in Individual Cases
In Gore, it was significant to the United States Supreme Court that at
the time the dispute arose between the plaintiff and the defendant, "there
[did] not appear to have been any judicial decision in Alabama or elsewhere
indicating that [the defendant's conduct] might give rise to such severe pun-
ishment."3 I The same is not true for Engle. While, prior to the Engle ver-
dict, there were no comparable punitive awards in a class action composed of
injured smokers as in that case, there were, however, punitive awards in
comparable individual civil suits.3 19
In 1998, a Florida jury awarded $450,000 in punitive damages to the
family of a deceased smoker who had died of a smoking-related injury.32 ° In
1999, a California jury awarded $50 million in punitive damages to an in-
jured smoker 321-although the award would eventually be reduced to $9 mil-
316. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 428 (quot-
ing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
317. See id. at 417; Gore, 517 U.S. at 587.
318. Gore, 517 U.S. at 584.
319. See Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 812 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that "it is appropriate
for [the court] to examine punitive damage awards in similar cases" in reference to Gore's
third guide post); see also St. John v. Coisman, 799 So. 2d 1110, 1115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (stating that "[a]s the United States Supreme Court noted in Gore, this last factor is a
broad one, which takes into account many circumstances, including fair notice to the defen-
dant that he can expect to be hit with a punitive damage[s] award similar to the one actually
imposed"). Unlike civil penalties or criminal sanctions, other punitive awards would appear
more valuable because they should provide "'fair notice not only of the conduct that will
subject [the defendant] to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose."' State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 417 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 574).
320. Vivian Wakefield, Verdict Is Heard Worldwide: Tobacco Penalty Boosts Cigarette
Foes, FLA. TIMES-UNION, June 12, 1998, at B I. It would be noted that since the family had
been awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages, bringing the total verdict to $950,000, the
case clearly satisfied State Farm I in terms of the ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, since it was less than 1 to 1. See id.
321. Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I), 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 496 (Ct. App. 2001).
This was the Henley case discussed earlier.
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lion because of State Farm 1322 Later, in 1999, an Oregon jury would award
$79.5 million in punitive damages to the family of another smoker who had
died of a smoking-related injury.323 In 2000, prior to the Engle punitive
award, another California jury would award $20 million in punitive damages
to a sick smoker, 324 although the verdict would be reversed on other
grounds.3 5
Prior to the punitive award in Engle, punitive awards of $450,000,326
$50 million,3 27 $79.5 million,328 and $20 million 32 9 had been rendered against
322. See supra notes 68-78 and accomp~anying text.
323. This was the Williams case discussed earlier. See supra notes 80-91 and accompany-
ing text. Although the Supreme Court of Oregon has upheld the $79.5 million punitive award,
even in light of State Farm I, as noted, the United States Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction
to review this issue, see Philip Morris USA v. Williams, No. 05-1256 (Or. Mar. 30, 2006), and
it remains to be seen if the entire punitive award will be allowed to stand. Since the compen-
satory damages in Williams III were only $521,485.80, which was stated to be a ratio of puni-
tive damages to compensatory damages of 96 to 1, see 92 P.3d at 130, 144, the United States
Supreme Court may still yet find that the $79.5 million punitive award is "unconstitutionally
excessive." Cf Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams P), 127 P.3d 1165, 1182 (Or. 2006).
Assuming, arguendo, that a minimum ratio of 1 to 1, and a maximum ratio of 10 to 1, and that
the $521,485.80 in compensatory damages that were ultimately awarded in that case had to be
used, a court could find that an appropriate punitive award would fall somewhere between
$500,000 and $5 million.
324. Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 820 (Ct. App. 2004); Harriet
Chiang, $20 Million Jury Award to Smoker, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2000, at Al.
325. Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 864; Smoker Cancer Award Returned for Retrial, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 8, 2004 at 1. In Whiteley, plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed suit against two ciga-
rette manufacturers after the wife was diagnosed with lung cancer, alleging claims based on
various theories of fraud. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 812, 819. After a jury would award the plaintiffs
about $1.7 million in compensatory damages, and $20 million in punitive damages, id. at 819-
20, the two cigarette manufacturers would appeal claiming, inter alia, that they could not "be
liable for fraud, negligent design, or other such product liability claims based on conduct
occurring from January 1, 1988 to January 1, 1998" because of a former state immunity stat-
ute California Civil Code § 1714.45. Id. at 812-13. The appellate court would agree with the
cigarette manufacturers that the immunity statute provided them complete immunity for the
ten-year period and find that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could
not base liability upon any of their conduct occurring within such period. Id. at 812-13.
Consequently, the appellate court would reverse the judgment in favor of plaintiffs and re-
mand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. Id. at
864. The court mentioned that while it found it unnecessary to address the manufacturers'
challenge to the punitive damages award, it noted that the trial court would "doubtless be
guided by" the United States Supreme Court's decision in State Farm L Whiteley, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 864. This seems to suggest that the appeals court believed that State Farm I would
have required the $20 million punitive damages award, which was approximately twelve times
the $1.7 million compensatory damages award, to be reduced. Again, assuming a minimum
ratio of 1 to 1 and a maximum ratio of 10 to 1, the punitive award would fall somewhere be-
tween $1.7 million to $10.7 million.
326. Wakefield, supra note 320.
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the cigarette makers. Could these awards have provided "fair notice" to the
tobacco defendants in Engle that their conduct could subject them to punitive
damages?33 And, if so, did such punitive awards provide them "fair notice"
as to the severity of such an award? The former would certainly seem the
case even though the $450,000 award was the only award rendered in Flor-
ida,331 the $50 million award was reduced to $9 million,332 the $79.5 million
award may still yet be reduced, and the $20 million award has been com-
327. Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I/), 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 38 (Ct. App. 2004).
328. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams 111), 92 P.3d 126, 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
329. Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 820.
330. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), appd in part, quashed in part, rem "d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006) (listing
the defendants in the case).
331. There does not appear to be any reason why verdicts against cigarette manufacturers
in jurisdictions outside of Florida are not relevant for this purpose. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that at the time Engle was filed, Florida had a statutory presumption of excessiveness of
any punitive damage awards exceeding three times the amount of compensatory damages in
cases based on negligence, strict liability, products liability, and breach of warranty. See FLA.
STAT. § 768.73(1)(a)-(b) (1997) (amended 1999) (although the wording of the statute has
since changed, this version was applicable to Engle); Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 434. The statu-
tory presumption, however, did not apply to class action suits, and therefore was not an issue
in Engle IV. § 768.73(l)(a) (1997) (amended 1999). Nevertheless, if Engle is to be compared
to individual suits where punitive damages were awarded, this statutory presumption must be
taken into account. The presumption, however, was hardly conclusive and could be overcome
if the claimant demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that the specific circum-
stances justify the award. § 768.73(l)(b) (1997) (amended 1999). A case illustrating the
statutory presumption of excessiveness being overcome by a claimant is Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Florida one year
before the Engle verdict. 749 So. 2d 483, 483-84 (Fla. 1999). In Ballard, Florida's highest
court upheld a $31 million punitive damages award to a claimant in an asbestos case even
though it was almost eighteen times the $1.8 million compensatory damages award. Id. at
484-85, 488-89. The court found that the presumption of excessiveness was overcome by
clear and convincing evidence that the asbestos manufacturer's conduct was egregious, and
exhibited a flagrant disregard for the safety of persons exposed to asbestos products. Id. at
483, 488-89. This raises another question: Could the verdict in Engle be compared with
punitive damage awards in asbestos cases? There is a much longer line of decisions awarding
punitive damages in asbestos cases than in tobacco litigation. See generally GERALD W.
BOSTON, PUNITIvE DAMAGES IN TORT LAW, ch. 20 (1993) (explaining the history of punitive
damages in asbestos litigation). It is apparently claimed by some that the "disease processes"
in asbestos and tobacco cases are similar, although the warning and liability issues might be
different. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1181 n.92 (1995). Further, it has been stated
that "the asbestos industry [has] engaged in a pattern of deception remarkably similar to that
of the tobacco industry." Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Pub-
lic Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 194 (2000).
332. Henley II, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38, 75.
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pletely overturned.333 The latter would also appear true if one undertook
simple arithmetic. Taking the Engle plaintiffs' apparent initial estimate of a
class size of 300,000,13  this would amount to $483,000 per class member
based on that $145 billion punitive award. Further, if the plaintiffs' subse-
quent estimate of a class size of 700,000 is more accurate, 35 this figure
would be less than half that amount, or approximately $207,000 per class
member. Based on comparable smoking-related verdicts in individual suits,
the cigarette makers appear to have no basis to complain about any disparity
with respect to the punitive award in Engle.3 3 6
333. It would seem that the amount of any other punitive damages awarded against a ciga-
rette manufacturer, or an award with which the cigarette manufacturer was threatened, would
be relevant in this regard.
334. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 443.
335. Id.
336. Although punitive awards are still being challenged in most of the cases, awards
rendered after the one in Engle also do not help the cigarette makers' case in regard to any
disparity. One punitive award that has survived such a challenge, however, occurred in 2001,
the year following Engle IV. See Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 645-46
(Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1567, 1567 (2006). In Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., a
California jury awarded a sick smoker over $5.5 million in general damages and $3 billion in
punitives, although the punitive award was reduced first to $100 million, and later to $50
million. Id. The $50 million punitive award, which exceeded the 4 to 1 ratio but was less
than 10 to 1, stood after the United States Supreme Court declined to intervene. Id. There
were a number of other punitive awards against the cigarette makers following the one in
Engle and Boeken. In 2002, an Oregon jury ordered a cigarette maker to pay $150 million in
punitives in the case of a smoker who died of a smoking-related injury. Estate of Schwarz v.
Philip Morris Inc., 135 P.3d 409, 414 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). Ultimately, the state court of ap-
peals vacated the judgment for punitive damages and remanded for a new trial on the amount
of those damages, basing its decision on the trial court's failure to give jury instructions which
limited the jury's consideration of out-of-state evidence in apparent violation of the order of
State Farm. See generally id at 427-33. In another case in 2002, a federal district court
judge imposed a $15 million punitive award in favor of an injured smoker. See Fairclough,
Reynolds Ordered to Pay, supra note 311. In a third case in 2002, a California jury awarded a
record $28 billion in punitive damages to an injured smoker, although the award would later
be reduced to $28 million. See Philip Morris Hit with Record $28 Billion Punitive Award,
LAW. WKLY. U.S., Oct. 14, 2002, at 2; see also Woman with Cancer to Accept Smaller Award,
but Appeal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2002, at A4. In 2003, an Arkansas federal jury rendered a
verdict awarding $15 million in punitive damages to the family of a smoker who died of a
smoking-related injury, although the award was later nullified by the trial judge. See Linda
Satter, Jury: Smoker's Kin Due $19 Million, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, May 24, 2003, at 1A;
see also Tobacco Brief-Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.: Judge Eliminates $15 Million in
Punitive Damages in Case, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2003, at CI 1. Also, in 2003, a New York jury
awarded the widow of a deceased smoker $8 million in punitive damages. See William Gla-
berson, $8 Million Award to Widow Punishes Tobacco Company, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004,
at B1. Although there appears to have been no cases awarding punitive damages against
cigarette manufacturers in 2004, another New York jury ordered a cigarette manufacturer to
pay $17.1 million in punitive damages to a sick smoker in 2005. See Bob Van Voris, Jury
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2. Possible Civil and Criminal Sanctions
A related question is whether the tobacco defendants' conduct in Engle
could have subjected them to any civil sanctions or even possibly criminal
punishment. It is important to mention that courts have recognized that there
are "common law tort duties that do not lend themselves to a comparison
with statutory penalties. ' 337 Further, as noted earlier, at least theoretically,
under Florida law, punitive damages are supposed to apply to wrongdoing
not coverable by criminal law.338 In St. John v. Coisman,339 a Florida appel-
late court found that "[t]here [was] no comparable criminal or civil statute
which punishes false arrest in Florida."34  In Williams III, discussed ear-
lier,341 the Oregon Appellate Court found "that [the State of] Oregon [did]
not provide civil sanctions for [the cigarette manufacturer's] conduct and that
the criminal statutes [referenced by the] plaintiff ... were not truly compara-
ble." '342 Whether the tobacco defendants in Engle had "fair notice," by way
of possibly civil and/or criminal sanctions, is not easily answered.34 3  It
would be noted, however, that the Third District would state that Engle in-
volved "the same alleged misconduct" as in the case brought by the State of
Florida against the tobacco companies.3" In that case, State v. American
Awards $18.8 Million to an Individual Smoker, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 30, 2005, at 3C. Al-
though it remains to be seen if, and how much, the cigarette makers pay in terms of punitive
damages in these cases, Engle's less than a half a million dollars per claimant in punitive
damages (assuming a class of 300,000 or more) may wind up being a bargain compared to
these cases.
337. Cont'l Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1241 (1997).
338. See infra notes 396-97.
339. 799 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
340. Id. at 1115.
341. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
342. See Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams IV), 92 P.3d 126, 145 (Or. Ct. App.
2004) (citing its earlier opinion in Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams 1), 48 P.3d 824,
824 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)). The criminal statutes relied on by the plaintiff dealt with the crime
of manslaughter. See Williams I, 48 P.3d at 842.
343. See generally Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
344. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle I), 853 So. 2d 434, 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003), app"d in part, quashed in part, remd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,2006).
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Tobacco Co.,345 Florida brought suit against the tobacco companies seeking
recovery of Medicaid expenditures it had made on behalf of smokers.
3 46
If the Third District is correct that the two cases involved "the same al-
leged misconduct, 3 47 then Florida's tobacco lawsuit might be relevant to this
inquiry.348
Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act3 4 9 formed the cornerstone
of Florida's litigation against the tobacco makers. 50 However, other statu-
tory provisions were utilized as well.3 5' Florida asserted that the cigarette
manufacturers violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act,352 the Florida Drug and Cosmetic Act, 353 a statute prohibiting the sale of
cigarettes to minors, 314 two Florida misleading advertising statutes, 355 a Flor-
345. 707 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
346. Id. at 852. For a discussion of Medicaid, see supra note 238.
347. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 468. The general theme underlying the Florida suit was that
the tobacco industry had conspired to conceal the addictive nature of nicotine and that smok-
ing caused injury. See Third Amended Complaint, State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 707 So. 2d 851
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Nos. 96-3434 & 96-4193), available at
http://stic.neu.edu/Fl/Fla3rd.htm.
348. See id.
349. FLA. STAT. § 409.910 (2006).
350. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 1-12. As noted, before the Flor-
ida suit would be brought, the Florida legislature amended Florida's Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act making it easier for the State in any recoupment suit. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910
(1995); see also Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d
1239, 1244 (Fla. 1996) (discussing history and impact of the 1994 amendment to the Act).
351. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 9 89, 178, 184-87, 190-93, 214,
220, 234-35.
352. See FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (2006); Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347,
174-89. Florida alleged that the tobacco companies engaged in "unconscionable acts or prac-
tices and unfair and deceptive acts or practices" in violation of this Act, which is designed to
protect consumers in commercial transactions. See id. T 187.
353. See FLA. STAT. § 499.001; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 174-89.
Florida alleged that the tobacco companies' cigarette products were drugs and devices within
the meaning of this Act and that the tobacco companies were guilty under the Act of false and
misleading advertising concerning the said products. See Third Amended Complaint, supra
note 347, 9 174-89.
354. See FLA. STAT. § 569.101; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 88-110.
One of the allegations made by Florida was that the tobacco companies targeted minors as the
source of new markets. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 88-110.
355. See FLA. STAT. §§ 817.06, .41; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 19 174-
89. While false advertising pertaining to the Florida Drug and Cosmetic Act must pertain to a
drug, device, or cosmetic, these provisions prohibit misleading advertising with respect to
generally any merchandise offered to the Florida public for sale. See Third Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 347, T 185.
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ida nuisance statute,356 and the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO).
357
While the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act normally limits Florida to
recovery of the monies it paid for medical assistance to Medicaid recipients,
it appears to permit a sanction in the form of treble damages "[i]n cases of
suspected criminal violations or fraudulent activity," '358 and Florida would
seek such a sanction in its suit against the tobacco makers.359 A party who
willfully violates Florida's unfair and deceptive trade practices statute,
known as Florida's "Little FTC Act,"36 may be subject to a civil penalty of
up to "$10,000 for each such violation."36' Similarly, a violation of the Flor-
ida Drug and Cosmetic Act can subject a party to a fine of up to "$5,000 per
violation per day." '362 One is considered criminally liable under the statute
prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to minors.3 63  Further, a violation of Flor-
ida's misleading advertising statute can lead to a criminal prosecution, 364 or a
civil action in which punitive damages are specifically authorized.3 65 A pub-
lic nuisance charge is a crime under Florida law. 366 Additionally, a violation
356. FLA. STAT. § 823.01; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 1 186.
357. FLA. STAT. § 895.01 (1995); Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 190-237.
358. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(17)(a) (2006).
359. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 177.
360. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 635 So. 2d 106, 107-08, 108 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
361. FLA. STAT. § 501.2075. Such party may also be liable for attorney fees as well. Id.
Florida sought both the civil penalty and attorney fees under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act in its action against the tobacco companies. See Third Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 347, 188.
362. FLA. STAT. § 499.066(3). Injunctive relief is also possible for violations of this Act.
Id. § 499.066(2).
363. Id. § 569.101.
364. Id. § 817.06(2).
365. Id. § 817.41(1), (6). The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be
made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof,
any misleading advertisement. Such making or dissemination of misleading adver-
tising shall constitute and is hereby declared to be fraudulent and unlawful, de-
signed and intended for obtaining money or property under false pretenses.
(6) Any person prevailing in a civil action for violation of this section shall be
awarded costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, and may be awarded punitive
damages in addition to actual damages proven. This provision is in addition to any
other remedies prescribed by law.
FLA. STAT. § 817.41(1), (6). Florida courts have specifically recognized that this provision "is
penal in character ... [and] the type of penal statute the violation of which affords civil re-
lief." Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding Club, Ltd., 403 So. 2d 1367, 1369 n.3 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964)).
366. FLA. STAT. § 823.01.
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of the Florida RICO Act is a serious criminal offense.3 67 Punishment could
entail criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, 68 and either: a) a fine of
up to $10,000;369 or b) in lieu of such fine where the offender derives pecuni-
ary value or "cause[s] personal injury or property damage or other loss,. . . a
fine [of up to three] times the gross value gained or [three] times the gross
loss caused, whichever is the greater, [may be imposed], plus court costs and
the costs of investigation and prosecution, reasonably incurred., 370 In addi-
tion to, or in place of the above, possible civil remedies include: 1) divesting
the offender of any interest in the enterprise; 2) imposing restrictions upon
the offender's activities; 3) dissolving or reorganizing the organization; 4)
suspending or revoking a license or permit granted to the enterprise by a state
agency; 5) forfeiting or revoking the charter of a Florida corporation or a
foreign corporation organized to do business within the state;37 and/or 6)
being subject to an action by the state for three times the actual damages the
state sustained as a result of the RICO violation.
3 72
If the claims asserted by the State of Florida in its lawsuit against the
tobacco makers are any indication, then there were both civil and criminal
sanctions to which the tobacco defendants in Engle could have been sub-
ject. 373  Further, while the United States Supreme Court in State Farm I
367. Id. § 895.04.
368. See id. § 775.082.
369. See id § 775.083(1)(b).
370. Id. § 895.04(2).
371. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(1)(a)-(e).
372. Id. § 895.05(7). Florida would seek triple damages under this provision. See Third
Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 217, 231, and 237. This provision also allowed
Florida to recover attorneys' fees-trial and appellate-and court costs, but not punitive dam-
ages. See FLA. STAT. § 895.05(7).
373. Is the Federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (2000), another possible sanction in which the tobacco defendants in Engle could
have been subject? The Federal RICO imposes criminal and civil liability on any person who:
1) invests income from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise; 2) acquires through a
pattern of racketeering activity an interest in an enterprise; 3) conducts an enterprises' affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity; or 4) conspires to do any of these things. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a)-(d). In 1999, one year before the Engle punitive award would be rendered, the
United States brought suit against the tobacco companies and their research organizations
"claiming that they engaged in a fraudulent pattern of covering up the dangers of tobacco use
and marketing to minors," basing its claim for damages and equitable relief on three federal
statutes, including the Federal RICO statute. United States v. Philip Morris Inc. (Philip Mor-
ris 1), 396 F.3d 1190, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2005). While the district court dismissed claims based
on the other statutes, it allowed the government's RICO claim to stand. Id. Later, the district
court ruled that the cigarette companies violated racketeering laws by deceiving the public
about the dangers of smoking, and although it did not impose any monetary penalties, it im-
posed other remedial measures. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc. (Philip Morris 11), No.
99-2496, slip op. at 1650-51 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2006).
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found that any claim about possible loss of business, disgorgement of profits,
and imprisonment were merely speculative in that case,374 can the same be
said with respect to the tobacco companies that were sued by the State of
Florida?375 Was the threat speculative or real?
3. Florida's Lawsuit Against Big Tobacco
Speaking of Florida's tobacco lawsuit raises another interesting ques-
tion relative to Gore's third guide post: Did that lawsuit itself provide the
tobacco defendants in Engle with "fair notice" that their conduct could entail
a substantial punitive award? 376 After the state's case was brought, the to-
bacco companies agreed, among other things, to pay Florida more than $11.3
billion.377 The Third District was probably correct in observing that Engle
and Florida's lawsuit against the cigarette makers involved the same "allega-
tions of misconduct., 378  However, the Florida Appellate Court appears to
have been wrong in trying to suggest that the claims for punitive damages
were the same in both cases.379 In this regard, it is important to understand
that section 768.72 of the Florida Statutes "requires a plaintiff to provide the
374. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 428
(2003).
375. See State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 707 So. 2d 851, 853 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
As shown, under the Florida statutes asserted by the state against the tobacco companies, said
companies could have been subject to substantial fines, imprisonment, and loss of any busi-
ness licenses within the state. See supra pp. 52-55. Further, in its lawsuit, Florida clearly
sought "disgorgement of any profits earned on the sale of the [tobacco] companies' products
in Florida." Am. Tobacco Co., 707 So. 2d at 853. Florida appears to recognize the disgorge-
ment theory of damages. See, e.g., Montage Group, Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Computer Sys., Inc.,
889 So. 2d 180, 196 & n.15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that "the remedy of dis-
gorgement was appropriate under the facts of this case"). Whether Florida would be entitled
to such remedy under the Florida RICO Act, however, might be questionable. See Philip
Morris 1, 396 F.3d at 1199 (rejecting the United States' claim that disgorgement is within the
equitable jurisdiction provided for under the Federal RICO Act).
376. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 585 (1996).
377. See Gady A. Epstein & Jacqueline Soteropoulos, State Kicks Butt, TAMPA TRIB., Aug.
26, 1997, at 1. The $ 11.3 billion was payable over 25 years. Id. The Florida Settlement
Agreement was entered into in 1997, three years before the Engle verdict. See Settlement
Agreement at 1, State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466 AlH (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Aug. 25,
1997), available at http://stic.neu.edu/Fl/flsettle.htin [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
378. See Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 467 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app 'd in part, quashed in part, rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
379. See id. at 468 (stating "[tihe claims for punitive damages in the Florida v. American
Tobacco Co. case and in this [Engle] action are based on the same alleged facts. The punitive-
damage claims in both cases addressed the same alleged misconduct and the same public
interest.").
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[trial] court with a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages before
the [trial] court may allow a claim for punitive damages to be included in a
plaintiff's complaint.""38 As the Supreme Court of Florida noted in Engle VI
regarding the state's tobacco lawsuit: "[Florida's] only claim for punitive
damages arose from the alleged violation of [the] Florida statutory provision
prohibiting misleading advertising. None of the other statutory provisions
alleged to be violated by the [tobacco companies] ... allowed the recovery
of punitive damages. 3 8' The trial court in State v. American Tobacco Co.
apparently found that Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act provided
only a factual basis for recovery of Medicaid costs, not punitive damages.382
It did, however, permit a claim for punitive damages to be asserted under
Florida Statutes section 817.41, the misleading advertising statute, since this
statute specifically authorized awards of such damages for violations of its
terms. 
3 83
380. Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 1995). Section 768.72 of
the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part as follows:
In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a rea-
sonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would pro-
vide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages. The claimant may move to amend
her or his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages as allowed by the rules of civil
procedure.
FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (2006). The Supreme Court of Florida has construed this provision "to
create a substantive legal right not to be subject to a punitive damages claim ... until the trial
court makes a determination that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery of puni-
tive damages." Globe Newspaper Co., 658 So. 2d at 519; see also Wilson v. Edenfield, 968 F.
Supp. 681, 683-84 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
381. See Engle v. Liggett Group Inc.(Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 17, n.7 (Fla.
July 6, 2006).
382. See Transcript of the Florida Tobacco Litigation Symposium-Fact, Law, Policy, and
Significance, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 737, 757 (1998) [hereinafter Transcript]. One of the
attorneys representing Florida in its lawsuit against the tobacco companies later explained,
"[Florida was] limited in [its] punitives to fraud under Chapter 817. The judge had stricken all
of [Florida's] other theories of punitives, believing that [it was] limited to the Medicaid [a]ct."
Id. As noted previously, the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act specifically authorizes the
imposition of treble damages in certain instances. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
It is also clear that the Florida RICO Act, which was probably Florida's second most impor-
tant claim against the tobacco companies, did not authorize punitive damages where triple
damages were being sought under it, as Florida would seek in that case. See FLA. STAT. §
895.04 (2006); Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 217, 231, 237.
383. FLA. STAT. § 817.41(6) (2006). Section 817.41(6) plainly authorizes awards of puni-
tive damages for violations of its terms. Id. For a reading of this provision, see supra note
365. As one Florida appellate court explained, this section "creates an entitlement to punitive
damages." Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 635 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994). The fact that Florida was limited with respect to punitive damages is clearly reflected
by its Third Amended Complaint. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 185.
Florida's only request for punitive damages related to alleged violations of section 817. Id.
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Punitive damages did not play as big a role in Florida's case against the
cigarette makers as one might believe. The threat of such damages was lim-
ited solely to Florida proving a violation of its false advertising statute.384
The $11 billion that the tobacco companies agreed to pay under the Florida
Settlement Agreement would therefore appear to be more properly viewed as
compensatory-reimbursement to Florida for the cost it incurred through
Medicaid for injured smokers-as opposed to punitive in nature. 385 If this is
correct, the $11 billion figure could have been a barometer of the compensa-
tory damages to which the plaintiffs and their class in Engle might have been
entitled.3" 6 However, the Engle plaintiffs and their class were not as con-
strained as Florida was in its lawsuit. Florida was restricted to seeking re-
covery for those Medicaid costs that had occurred after July 1, 1994, the ef-
fective date of the amendment to the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act.38 7
In addition, the trial court had apparently ruled that Florida "could not re-
cover future damages under" this Act.3"' Obviously, Medicaid payments
account for only a fraction of the total medical care costs attributable to
smoking, and the plaintiffs and their class in Engle would not be limited to
Medicaid incurred expenditures.38 9 Further, the plaintiffs and their class in
Engle would be entitled to seek compensatory damages consisting of more
than hospital and medical expenses.39' They would be entitled to seek dam-
Florida, however, did purport to preserve its right to assert punitive damages under section
768.72. See id. 10.
384. See id. 185.
385. Settlement Agreement, supra note 377, at 8-10.
386. This is true even if the then present day value of the award was said to only be $6
billion. See Transcript, supra note 382, at 757.
387. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239,
1256 (Fla. 1996) (ruling that the State of Florida could properly bring an action under the
Act's statutory authority, but that the Act only applied to causes of action that accrued after
July 1, 1994, the effective date of the 1994 amendments).
388. Transcript, supra note 382, at 756. One of Florida's attorneys explained that this
limited Florida's damages under Medicaid to $1.2 billion and meant that the state would have
to return to court every couple of years to seek damages against the tobacco companies. Id.
In its lawsuit, however, Florida would agree to give up its right to bring those future lawsuits.
Id. at 757 (attorney making clear that the Settlement Agreement "settles those future claims
that we were going to have to come back time and time again to get"); see Settlement Agree-
ment, supra note 377, at 11-12. To the extent that the monies payable under the Settlement
Agreement exceeded the amount then due Florida, it would appear that it primarily represents
damages in the form of reimbursement for future Medicaid and other health-related expenses,
and not punitive damages. Id. at 10.
389. According to Florida's Governor, the state was "spending over $400 million a year
for smoking-related, tobacco-related injuries to [its] Medicaid recipients." See Transcript,
supra note 382, at 738.
390. See FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (Civ.) 6.2(a)-(f).
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ages for items such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, lost earnings, and
loss of consortium. 391
The tobacco defendants in Engle had to know from Florida's lawsuit
against them and from the subsequent Florida Tobacco Settlement that they
had exposure to a sizeable compensatory award.39 Further, even though no
actual award of punitive damages was made in State v. American Tobacco,
Co.,393 an argument could certainly be made that Florida's lawsuit against the
tobacco makers also provided them with fair notice that their conduct might
support a large punitive award such as would be rendered in Engle as well.394
V. FLORIDA LAW ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Under Florida law, "punitive damages are recoverable in all actions for
damages based on [tortious acts] which involve the ingredients of malice,
moral turpitude, or wanton and outrageous [conduct]., 395 To support a claim
for punitive damages under Florida law, the plaintiff must allege and prove
conduct by the defendant
of "a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of
human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous ef-
fects, or there is that entire want of care which would raise the pre-
sumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which
shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard
of the safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless indifference
to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional viola-
tion of them."
396
391. Id.
392. Could the same thing not be said about the lawsuits brought by all of the states
against the tobacco companies that were filed between 1994 and 1998 which resulted in an
unprecedented multibillion-dollar settlement prior to the Engle I verdict? For a listing of the
state cases brought against the tobacco makers, see Tobacco Lawsuit Summary Chart,
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/summary.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
393. 707 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
394. See Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, Note, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A
Comparison of Public Entity Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 549, 573
(2000). "The Florida jury's emotional response to the tobacco industry's alleged deception of
the public could have belonged to any one of the juries in the state lawsuits." Id.
395. 17 FLA. JUR. 2D Damages § 128 (2004).
396. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 20 n. 12 (Fla. 1959) (quoting Cannon v. State, 107
So. 360, 363 (Fla. 1926)).
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Florida law also recognizes that punitive damages serve the dual role of de-
terrence and retribution.39 7 Further, Florida law envisions that "[p]unitive
damages apply to wrongdoing not covered by the criminal law, where the
private injuries inflicted partake of public wrongs. ' 98 In fact, the Supreme
Court of Florida has stated that punitive damages are "the most satisfactory
way to correct evil-doing in areas not covered by the criminal law."3 99
It is clear under Florida law that it is within the jury's discretion
whether or not to award punitive damages and to determine the amount that
should be awarded.400 Traditionally, punitive damages "are to be measured
by the enormity of the offense, entirely aside from the measure of compensa-
tion for the injured plaintiff., 40 1 In determining the amount of punitive dam-
ages, the defendant's wealth has also historically been an important consid-
eration under Florida law.40 2
It has been noted that Florida courts are usually hesitant about disturb-
ing punitive damages verdicts returned by juries. 43 Further, it appears that
under Florida law, neither party has any recourse to a jury verdict regarding
punitive damages, unless such party can prove either fraud or an improperly
influenced jury.404 As discussed earlier, the Third District Court of Appeal in
397. See Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (Fla.
1982).
398. Id. at 1042.
399. Campbell v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 531 (Fla. 1974).
400. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978).
401. Arab Termite & Pest Control, 409 So. 2d at 1043.
402. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1985). In this
regard, the Supreme Court of Florida has stated that "'the greater the defendant's wealth, the
greater it [sic] must be, the punitive damages assessed in order to get his attention regardless
of the amount of [actual] damages awarded to the plaintiff."' Id. (quoting Farish v. Bankers
Multiple Line Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 12, 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)); see also Rinaldi, 314
So. 2d at 763.
403. Lassitter v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976). The
Supreme Court of Florida has explained as follows:
Although the verdict may be for considerably more or less than in the judgment of
the court it ought to have been, still the court should decline to interfere, unless the
amount is so great or small as to indicate that the jury must have found it while un-
der the influence of passion, prejudice, or gross mistake. In order to shock the sense
of justice of the judicial mind the verdict must be so excessive or so inadequate so
as at least to imply an inference that the verdict evinces or carries an implication of
passion or prejudice, corruption, partiality, improper influences, or the like.
Id.
404. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. Watson, 428 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1983).
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Engle IV appears to have determined that the jury had been improperly influ-
enced.4 5
To specifically determine whether a punitive damage award is excessive
under Florida law, courts consider the relationship between the amount
awarded and the degree of misconduct involved, as well as the defendant's
ability to pay the judgment. 6 It clearly appears that it was on this second
item-the defendant's ability to pay the judgment-that both the Third Dis-
trict and the Supreme Court of Florida based their conclusions on the fact
that the $145 billion punitive damage award in Engle was excessive under
Florida law.40 7 Certain observations, however, can be made with respect to
their apparent determination in that regard.
First, the trial court in Engle evidently felt that the tobacco defendants
could avoid financial ruin by simply raising cigarette prices, since this is how
the cigarette makers financed the payments under the tobacco settlement.4 8
Could there have been any merit to the trial court's position?
Second, while the combined net worth of all of the tobacco defendants
in Engle was supposedly only $8.3 billion, the net worth of just one of these
same defendants in the Williams case, discussed earlier, was said to be "over
$17 billion," more than double the purported combined figure in Engle.4 9 Is
there any merit to claims by plaintiffs that defendants sometimes purposely
decrease their net worth in order to avoid a high punitive award?
41°
Third, the Third District's determination that the tobacco defendants did
not have the ability to pay the judgment appears to have been primarily based
on the fact that the sum awarded was "roughly 18 times" their purported
combined net worth.4 1' However, as the Supreme Court of New Jersey has
noted, evidence of "ability to pay ... does not necessarily equate with net
405. See Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 467-68 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
406. Arab Termite & Pest Control, 409 So. 2d at 1043; see also Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Hickman, 445 So. 2d 1023, 1028 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
407. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 3, 25 (Fla.
July 6, 2006); Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 458.
408. Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, No.
94-08273, at 61 (Fla. 1lth Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), available at
http://fl I.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/tobacco/englerjfinaljudorder.pdf.
409. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams II1), 92 P.3d 126, 145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004);
see Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 456-57.
410. See John T. Simpson, Jr., Comment, Discovery of Net Worth in Bifurcated Punitive
Damages Cases: A Suggested Approach After Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 37 S.
TEX. L. REv. 193, 223 (1996).
411. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at457.
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worth," because "[d]epending on the facts of a case, a defendant's income
might be a better indicator of the ability to pay.
' 412
Fourth, there is no suggestion that the jury in Engle was improperly in-
structed regarding the issue of the tobacco defendants' ability to pay a puni-
tive award and/or that such award could not bankrupt them.41 3 Assuming
that the jury was properly instructed in this regard, under Florida law, the
jury is presumed to have followed the instructions given to them, "[a]bsent a
finding to the contrary.,
4 14
Fifth, while evidence of the Florida and Master Settlement Agreements
might have been admissible in Engle for the purpose of avoiding or mitigat-
ing punitive damages because they may have been relevant to the tobacco
defendants' ability to pay, was the trial court's apparent instruction to the
jury not to consider such evidence 4 " a reversible error as found by the Third
District? 416 This would not seem to be a sufficient basis for reversing an
award of punitive damages under Florida law since this evidence (which is
merely mitigation evidence) appears to relate to a matter that is collateral to
the main issue. 4
17
Sixth, while not definitively stating that wealth may not be considered,
State Farm has called into question the role of wealth in the punitive dam-
ages calculation.4 1 8 Assuming, arguendo, that a defendant's wealth is not
always an appropriate consideration to enhance the amount of punitive dam-
412. Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialties, Inc., 627 A.2d 1081, 1089 (N.J. 1993).
413. See Jury Instructions Phase II B: Punitive Damages, No. 94-8273 CA 22, at 6 (11 th
Cir. 2000), available at
http://www.altria.com/download/pdf/media englejuryinstructions.pdf (delineating the fi-
nancial factors that the jury could use as guidelines in determining the effect a punitive award
may have) [hereinafter Engle Jury Instructions]; see generally Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 456-58
(noting that the court blamed the size of the award on juror passion and prejudice).
414. See Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 So. 2d 932, 942 (Fla. 2000);
see also Engle Jury Instructions, supra note 413, at 11 (instructing the jury that "[i]t is only a
defendant's current ability to pay a punitive damage award that is relevant, and not whether a
defendant can pay using a pay out or an installment plan," despite the Third District's later
finding that plaintiffs' counsel made improper comments regarding installment payments);
Wransky v. Dalfo, 801 So. 2d 239, 243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing case for
failure to give jury instructions "that punitive damages should not be allowed to destroy or
bankrupt a defendant").
415. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 468-69.
416. Id.; Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 2 (Fla. July 6,
2006). In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida did not address this specific ruling by the
Third District. Id.
417. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 248 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
418. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S.
408 (2003).
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ages, should this argument cut both ways where a defendant's wealth, or lack
thereof, is not always an appropriate consideration to avoid an otherwise
proper punitive damages award. In other words, should the possibility of
bankruptcy always be an absolute bar to an award of punitive damages?4 9
As shown above, there are a number of questions raised relating to the
conclusion by the Third District and Supreme Court of Florida that the Engle
punitive damages award was impermissibly excessive, even under Florida
law.
VI. CONCLUSION
To argue, as the Third District did, that mass torts, such as those found
in Engle, are not proper for a class action is one thing.42° To suggest, how-
ever, that the punitive award in that case was unconstitutionally excessive is
wholly another.
As demonstrated herein, an argument could certainly be made that the
jury's punitive award in Engle was not violative of the Gore guide posts as
the United States Supreme Court refined them in State Farm, and that the
award, therefore, was not unconstitutionally excessive under federal law.
The conduct of the tobacco defendants in Engle could certainly be said to be
reprehensible. As noted, most of the factors identified by the United States
Supreme Court, pertaining to the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct, appear to have been present in Engle.42' Further, the appellate
courts that have reviewed the awarding of punitive damages in the individual
tobacco cases have not found the first guide post to be an issue.422 While the
second guide post has impacted punitive damages awards since State Farm,
reprehensibility is nevertheless supposed to be the most important guide post
in determining a punitive damages award's reasonableness. 423  There also
may have been an acceptable ratio of punitives to compensatories to satisfy
the second guide post, but neither the Supreme Court of Florida nor the Third
District was willing to wait and see.424 As suggested herein, the contention
419. Welch v. Epstein, 536 S.E.2d 408, 424 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the proposi-
tion "that the law on punitive damages [in South Carolina] has evolved to the point of erecting
an irrevocable financial barrier to the imposition of punitive damages if harsh financial reali-
ties emanate from the award") (emphasis added).
420. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 470.
421. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 202.
423. See State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419.
424. As noted, the trial plan called for the jury to determine punitives first and then com-
pensatories for the class, which federal courts have found presents no constitutional infirmity.
See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986). The Third District
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that it is not possible to complete the ratio guide post at the time the jury
returned the $145 billion punitive award does not by itself appear to provide
a basis to invalidate such an award. This was a multi-phase class action
where the compensatory damages to each member of the class had not yet
been determined. Steps should have been taken to ensure that recovery of
punitive damages was limited to only those class members who established
liability. The analysis under the ratio guide post could have either been es-
timated based on individual damages awards, deferred until all of the com-
pensatory damages were determined, or some combination thereof. Whether
Gore's second guide post was met or not is simply not clear. Further, it
could certainly be argued that the tobacco defendants in that case had fair
notice that their conduct might not only subject them to punishment, but to
severe punishment because of the punitive awards against them in the cases
prior to Engle425 and in the unprecedented litigation brought against them by
Florida as well as other states. Assuming, arguendo, that one believes the
cigarette makers were guilty of misconduct, as the jury in Engle apparently
did,426 the fact that a record setting punitive damages award was rendered in
that case really should have surprised no one, especially the cigarette makers.
Moreover, even if Florida law does not allow an award which would
force a defendant to file for bankruptcy, should this always be the case?
Florida law also says that punitive damages "are to be measured by the
enormity of the offense, 427 and that it is within the jury's discretion as to the
amount of any punitive damages.42' The jury in Engle exercised its discre-
tion and rendered an award of $145 billion in punitive damages to injured
simply did not allow Phase 3 in Engle to be completed. Further, what if the proper analysis is
not always simply a comparison of punitives to compensatories, but a comparison of the puni-
tives to the amount of harm, which may include harm that is uncompensated as well as poten-
tial harm? See supra notes 301-316 and accompanying text. From this perspective, is it
possible to view the Engle punitive award as a proxy for the thousands of Floridians, dead and
living, whose lives and health have been or may be immutably scarred by tobacco?
425. See supra notes 317-36 and accompanying text.
426. See Liggett Goup, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 441 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,2006).
427. Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (Fla.
1982). In Engle VI, the Supreme Court of Florida seems to be suggesting that post State Farm
jurisprudence no longer permits this. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-
1856, slip op. at 24 (Fla. July 6, 2006). But see Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347
F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing shortly after State Farm, that "[the] standard princi-
ple of penal theory that 'the punishment should fit the crime' in the sense of being propor-
tional to the wrongfulness of the defendant's action" is still applicable to punitive damages).
428. Arab Termite & Pest Control, 409 So. 2d at 1041 (citing Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty,
359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978)).
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Florida smokers and their survivors.42 9 While the Engle verdict may have
been unprecedented and, by far, the largest ever in U.S. history, 43 it was no
ordinary case. It was a mass-tort class action with an estimated class size of
between 300,000 and 700,000 plaintiffs that actually went to verdict.4 31 The
Supreme Court of Florida quite properly did not adopt the Third District's
conclusion that the punitive award in Engle was indicative of an improperly
influenced jury,432 as this jury verdict may very well have been merely re-
flective of the magnitude of the offense committed in that case.
4 33
Tobacco use was and continues to remain the country's greatest health
hazard.434 It undoubtedly was and continues to be a major issue in Florida,435
as in every other state.4 36 Even if the imposition of the $145 billion punitive
429. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441.
430. Rick Bragg, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record Damages, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2000, at Al.
431. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 442-43. As noted earlier, no mass-tort case had apparently
gone to trial prior to Engle. See Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad, supra note 183, at 20.
432. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 19-20.
433. Id. at 20. Although the punitive award in Engle has been criticized by many because
of its size, at least one observer believes that the "punitive award of $145 billion is letting the
tobacco industry off lightly." Brian H. Barr, Note, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds: The Improper
Assessment of Punitive Damages for an Entire Class of Injured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 787, 829 (2001). Supposedly, the plaintiffs in Dukes, see supra notes 283-85 and ac-
companying text, are "seek[ing] punitive damages between $450 and $510 billion" in that
employment discrimination case, alleging sex discrimination in pay and promotion. Eric S.
Dreiband, Willie Sutton Was a Piker, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at A7.
434. See MELISSA ALBUQUERQUE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
TOBACCO CONTROL STATE HIGHLIGHTS 2002: IMPACT AND OPPORTUNITY 7 (2002),
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/statehi/pdf 2002/02FrontMatter.pdf. Tobacco use is said to be
"the single most preventable cause of death and disease ... in the United States." Id. Ap-
proximately 400,000 deaths each year are attributable to smoking. See id. To put this in
perspective, "[o]ne in every five deaths in this country is attributable to smoking." Id. at 3.
To put this in another perspective, tobacco is said to "kill[] more people each year in the
United States than acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), car accidents, alcohol,
homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and fires, combined." Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61
Fed. Reg. 44396, 44398 (Aug. 28, 1996) (codified in scattered parts of 21 C.F.R.).
435. At the time the Engle case was brought, Florida officials estimated that that "[e]very
day in Florida, 35 people die from a smoking-related illness." Linda Kleindienst & John
Kennedy, Law Declares Medicaid War on Tobacco, ORLANDO SENT., May 27, 1994, at C1. It
had been estimated that in 1992 alone that it had cost taxpayers $289 million to treat approxi-
mately 39,000 Florida Medicaid patients for smoking-related illnesses. Id. For 300,000 to
700,000 of such persons, this would amount to $2 billion to $5 billion, assuming that the
health care costs were incurred at the same rate. See id.
436. Of course, tobacco use is an issue all over the world. In fact, it is being projected that
tobacco will kill a billion people this century, which is ten times more than the one hundred
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award would have the ruinous consequences alleged by the cigarette makers,
would it really touch upon due process concerns, or would it simply be self-
inflicted and well-deserved punishment that was overdue-assuming that
they were responsible for the misconduct claimed?
VII. EPILOGUE
The Third District in Engle would comment that "[c]lass certification in
mass-tort actions such as [in that case] ha[d] been historically disfavored by
courts throughout the nation." '4 37 This is true. The underlying rationale is
that "[w]hen personal-injury and death claims are involved, a strong feeling
prevails that everyone enmeshed in the dispute should have his [or her] own
day in court and be represented by a lawyer of his [or her] choice. 438 The
problem with this rationale as it relates to tobacco is that cigarette manufac-
turers have been largely shielded from suits brought by individual smok-
ers.4 39 This has occurred, in large part, because the courts have improperly
construed the very law that was designed to deal with the health problem
associated with smoking, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA), 440 to provide cigarette manufacturers special protection from state
law tort claims under the guise of "preemption.""' This is unfortunate be-
cause state law tort claims serve the important functions of regulation and
compensation." 2 By precluding state law tort claims from being asserted
against cigarette manufacturers, this has given them protection not accorded
to others and has prevented any regulation of their behavior, such as forcing
them to make cigarettes that are less hazardous. 443 It has also denied those
injured by their product the right to even seek compensation based solely on
this federal Act that was never intended to be used in such fashion.4" Fur-
million that it is said to have killed in the twentieth century. See Andrew Bridges, Curbing
Tobacco Best Step to Cut Cancer, MIAMI HERALD, July 11, 2006, at 11 A.
437. See Liggett Goup, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app 'd in part, quashed in part, rem "d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
438. 7AA CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1783 (3d
ed. 2005).
439. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 470.
440. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000).
441. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992) (holding that the
FCLAA preempted state law tort claims against cigarette manufacturers).
442. See id
443. See id.
444. For more on the preemption problem, see Harold C. Reeder, Lindsey v. Tacoma-
Pierce County Health Dep't: Cipollone Revisited, Billboards, State Law Tort Damages Ac-
tions, Federal Preemption and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 24
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 763 (2001).
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ther, one should not be misled by the few recent verdicts-record breaking
in fact-in favor of plaintiffs in individual suits, as the smokers in those
cases started smoking prior to 1969, when the FCLAA supposedly began
preempting state law tort claims against cigarette manufacturers." 5 That one
fact appears to have been crucial to these plaintiffs being able to get to a
jury."6 As the population continues to grow older, this "loophole" is closing
fast." 7 It "will not be of any assistance to [anyone] who began smoking after
1969." 44
8
The preemption fiasco is just one aspect, albeit a very important one, of
a larger problem, which is the "Law of Tobacco."" 9 "The Law of Tobacco
concerns ensuring the continued vitality of the tobacco industry by protecting
it, [not only] from liability suits, [but] other types of 'nuisances' such as ad-
vertising restrictions or FDA regulation. ' 450 The Third District's opinion in
Engle IV would appear to be another good illustration of the "Law of To-
bacco" in operation, where the appellate court reversed itself on the issue of
class certification and then made every possible ruling that it could in favor
of the tobacco defendants in that case.45' In stark contrast, the Supreme
Court of Florida showed great courage in Engle VI by first simply accepting
jurisdiction to review the case and then issuing a decision that did not bow to
the "Law of Tobacco. 45 1 As indicated by the premise of this article, the
only issue one might take with an otherwise well-written and well-reasoned
opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida in Engle was its ruling, unanimous
no less, that the punitive award in that case was unconstitutionally exces-
sive.453
Engle may signal the end to future smokers' class suits.4 54 Even class
suits that are not specifically brought to recover damages for the health prob-
445. See Harold C. Reeder, The "Law of Tobacco " Is a Major Contributing Factor That
Hampers Effective Resolution to the County's Tobacco Problem, 6 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 17,
52-53 (2004) [hereinafter Reeder, "Law of Tobacco '].
446. Id. at 52.
447. Id. at 53.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 21.
450. Reeder, "Law of Tobacco ", supra note 445, at 21.
451. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 53 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
452. Id. at 1, 53.
453. See id.
454. It would be interesting to see if the courts would reevaluate their stance on smokers'
class suits if the preemption problem did not exist. With a flood of lawsuits, possibly as never
seen before, a class action might be viewed more favorably.
67
Reeder: Engle, State Farm, Florida Law, and Punitive Damages: Was the $14
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LA W REVIEW
lems associated with smoking are being rejected by the courts.4" With pos-
sibly having an end to any real threat from either individual suits or class
actions, the future of Big Tobacco certainly looks bright.45 6 The question is:
at what cost-specifically, for how long and to what extent is this going to
prolong the health hazard associated with tobacco?
Reversal of the $145 billion punitive award was probably viewed as a
great victory for Big Tobacco. But was it really? Despite the discarding of
the mammoth punitive award, the cigarette manufacturers appear to have two
definite reasons not to be pleased with Florida's highest court, and they both
stem from the fact that the court did not completely dismantle the class. One
is obvious from the opinion while the other is not. Clearly, the tobacco de-
fendants could not be happy with the fact that class members will be allowed
to bring their own suit with the benefit of many of the findings by the jury in
Engle.4 7 This is going to encourage many to assert claims against the to-
bacco defendants who otherwise would not.58 This may also result in the
tobacco defendants paying significantly more than the almost $7 million (in
compensatory damages alone) that they currently are to pay to two of the
class representatives.4 59 The other reason, which cannot be gleamed from the
Supreme Court of Florida's opinion, involves the fact that when the tobacco
455. Last December, the Supreme Court of Illinois completely overturned a judgment of
$10.1 billion in a class action that claimed consumer fraud over "light" cigarettes. Price v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 50 (I11. 2005). The Illinois high court reversed the judg-
ment, which was $7.1 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in punitives, on the
ground that the FCLAA preempted claims against cigarette manufacturers under Illinois con-
sumer law. Id. at 50-51. See also Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio
2006) (reversing the certification of a limited class of cigarette purchasers from a six county
area in a consumer action brought over the way "light" cigarettes were marketed). But see
Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (certifying a class
of current and former smokers in a RICO action alleging that cigarette manufacturers induced
them to buy "light" cigarettes by falsely representing that they would experience reduced
health risks from lower amounts of tar and nicotine).
456. This is true despite the fact that the smoking rate in this country is said to be continu-
ing to decline. See Marc Kaufman, Smoking in United States Declines Sharply: Cigarette
Sales at a 54-Year Low, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at Al.
457. See Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 53.
458. Apparently, lawsuits have already been filed in response to the ruling by the Supreme
Court of Florida. See Christina Cheddar Berk, Cigarette Makers Ask for Review, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 9, 2006, at D3.
459. As noted earlier, following the verdict in Engle, one class member in a separate pro-
ceeding received a judgment of $37.5 million in compensatory damages. If this verdict is
upheld, it shows how the damages against the cigarette makers could easily accumulate.
Further, it would seem that all of the class members (including the three already with compen-
satory awards) would be permitted to seek punitive damages if the tobacco defendants are
found liable in their individual suits. See Weaver, supra note 312.
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defendants initially appealed from the $145 billion punitive verdict, they
apparently agreed that, in lieu of posting the full appeal bond, they would
"forfeit" $709 million which would be paid to the class no matter which side
won. 4 6 0 Of course, after the Third District reversed the case in its entirety,
including the class certification, it would be suggested that, since there was
no class to pay, this money would possibly be returned to the tobacco defen-
dants. 461 The decision by the Supreme Court of Florida has, therefore, made
it harder for the tobacco defendants to make the case that they are entitled to
this money back. For the tobacco defendants, there is still clearly a lot at
stake in Engle.
It will be most interesting to observe what happens in Engle from this
point forward. As this article was going to press, a motion for rehearing filed
by the tobacco defendants had still not been ruled upon by the Supreme
Court of Florida so the opinion in Engle VI was not yet final. Will the Su-
preme Court of Florida stand by its ruling in Engle V? Despite an obviously
careful and thoughtful opinion, there is still time for the "Law of Tobacco" to
interject itself before that Court. Further, even if Florida's Highest Court
holds firm, the tobacco defendants are likely to seek review from the United
States Supreme Court. Although from the surface, there does not appear to
be any basis for federal jurisdiction in Engle,462 with the "Law of Tobacco"
involved, one should not bet against the cigarette makers.
460. Vanessa O'Connell, Millions in Escrow Hang on Coming Ruling in Tobacco Case,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at B1.
461. See id.
462. Some, of course, had said the same thing about the other recent famous case that the
United States Supreme Court took from Florida, Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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